Marrying into Financial Abuse:
A Solution To Protect the
Elderly in California

ASHLEY E. RATHBUN*

I.
II.

III.
IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 228
ASSESSING THE PROBLEM OF FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE
IN MARRIAGES .................................................................................................. 233
A. The Prevalence of Financial Elder Abuse................................................ 235
B. California Marriage Statutes................................................................... 237
1. Distinctions Between Confidential and Public Marriages................ 239
2. Abuse of the Marriage Statutes......................................................... 241
DETERMINING CAPACITY ................................................................................... 243
A. Marital Capacity Requirements ............................................................... 245
B. Reasons for Capacity Requirements ........................................................ 247
INHERITANCE RIGHTS AND MARRIAGE ............................................................... 248
A. Probate Statutes Designed To Protect the Decedent’s Family ................ 249
B. California Protects Elders’ Deathtime Property Transfers ..................... 251
THE INADEQUACIES OF OTHER APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM .......................... 254
A. Texas’s Approach: Declaring a Marriage Voice Postdeath .................... 256
B. An Academic’s Approach: Requiring Testamentary
Capacity for Inheritance Rights............................................................... 258
C. The Inadequacies of Both Approaches..................................................... 259

* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 2005,
University of California, Davis. Special thanks to Professor Kris B. Panikowski, who
guided me throughout the process, and Ellen McKissock, Esq., who brought the problem
of financial elder abuse to my attention and provided me with countless insights. Thanks
also to Professors Gail A. Greene and Miranda O. McGowan, as well as Mary Obidinski,
David M. Dreyman, and Karen M. Harkins Slocomb, for their many hours of editing,
supporting, and advising me; and to the San Diego Law Review staff for their detailed
edits. Most of all, thanks to my family because I never could have gotten this far without
their love and patience.

227

VI.

VII.

ADOPTING A MARITAL CAPACITY TEST TO PREVENT FINANCIAL
ELDER ABUSE .................................................................................................... 261
A. Suggested Marital Capacity Test ............................................................. 262
1. Who Can Administer the Test? ......................................................... 264
2. Testing for Undue Influence.............................................................. 265
3. Timeframe for Administering the Test............................................... 266
4. Potential Costs of a Marital Capacity Test....................................... 267
5. Widespread Adoption of the Marital Capacity Test.......................... 268
B. Protecting Versus Restricting Marriage .................................................. 269
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 274

I. INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 2001, the once powerful and prominent former
California judge and lawmaker Ralph Dills married his stepdaughter,
Wendi Lewellen, who was thirty-four years his junior.1 To gain Dills’s
affection, Wendi reportedly impersonated her mother, Dills’s wife of
nearly thirty years, by dressing up in her clothing and wearing her
perfume.2 Dills sought comfort and companionship in Wendi after her
mother had passed away; Wendi sought financial support from Dills.3
Wendi and her previous husband had run into financial trouble and
had filed for bankruptcy; a few years later, they filed for divorce.4
Wendi lived with Dills while finalizing her divorce and married him
only five weeks after it was finalized.5 Wendi subsequently started
spending large sums of Dills’s money without his consent, leaving Dills
with the impression that he was destitute.6 Dills’s stepsons, Wendi’s
brothers, finally learned of the marriage after four months.7 When one
of Wendi’s brothers asked Dills why Wendi was spending so much of
Dills’s money, Dills explained, “‘I think she’s my wife.’”8 Dills did not
1. Elizabeth Fernandez, From Stepdaughter to Caretaker to Wife: Late Lawmaker’s
Sons Say Their Sister Took Advantage of Ailing Father, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18, 2002, at
A1, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2002-08-18/news/17557809_1_elderabuse-prevention-ralph-dills-rocklin. Wendi was fifty-seven years old at the time; Dills
was a frail ninety-one. Id.
2. Id. Dills had formally adopted Wendi’s two brothers but had not formally
adopted Wendi. Id. Dills married their mother in 1970, when Wendi was in her
midtwenties. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (“[Wendi] looted [Dills’s] money to the point where a befuddled Dills
believed he was going broke despite receiving nearly $13,700 in monthly pensions and
Social Security.”).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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understand the relationship he held with his stepdaughter-turned-wife.9
Wendi’s brothers accused her of marrying Dills both to “save hundreds
of thousands of dollars on estate taxes” and to reduce her financial
instability. 10 Advocates against elder abuse recognized that the
circumstances surrounding the marriage indicated that Dills was likely
the victim of elder abuse.11
Legal battles over Dills’s competence ensued between Wendi and her
siblings.12 Her brothers attempted to annul the marriage, claiming
Wendy married Dills when he suffered from dementia and lacked
competence to marry. 13 A psychologist confirmed the brothers’
suspicions when she examined Dills one month before he died.14 She
determined that Dills suffered from Alzheimer’s-type dementia and
“‘was of “unsound mind” to marry.’”15 Due to the progression of the

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Wendi also neglected him, allowing her dogs to use his bathroom as their
own to the point where it was so full of dog feces that he could not use it. Id. Dills
found himself a victim of both neglect and financial elder abuse. See id. California finds
financial elder—or dependent adult—abuse when a person or entity:
(1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property
of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud,
or both[;]
(2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or
personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with
intent to defraud, or both[; or]
(3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting,
appropriating, obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder
or dependent adult by undue influence, as defined in Section 1575 of the
Civil Code.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.30(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2009).
12. Fernandez, supra note 1. Wendi challenged the appointment of one of her
brothers as Dills’s temporary conservator, “telling the court that she was Dills’ wife . . .
and asked that [the brother] be removed as temporary conservator.”
Id.
Conservatorships consist of a fiduciary and legal relationship, wherein a conservator is
appointed to assist a “person who is unable to manage his or her financial resources or
properly provide for his or her personal needs, such as, food, clothing, and shelter.”
Bruce S. Ross, Conservatorship Litigation and Lawyer Liability: A Guide Through the
Maze, 31 STETSON L. REV. 757, 758 (2002) (describing the process of establishing a
conservatorship, the powers and duties of a conservator, and the four types of
conservatorships in California); see Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care:
The Law of Conservatorship in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 273 (1988).
13. Fernandez, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id. As of 2007, one study estimated that over two-thirds—69.9%—of persons
diagnosed with dementia suffer from Alzheimer’s disease. B.L. Plassman et al.,
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dementia, the psychologist determined that Wendi clearly knew of
Dills’s degenerating mental condition when she married him and that
“‘undue influence was exerted in terms of Mr. Dills marrying.’”16
Wendi clearly took advantage of Dills’s declining mental state for her
financial advantage.17
This high profile case illustrates a growing problem: 18 elderly
individuals—persons “65 years of age or older”19—can enter into
marriages without the capacity to understand the nature of marriage or
the potential repercussions of marrying.20 The ease with which an
elderly person can enter into marriage presents an opportunity for
unscrupulous individuals to marry elders of questionable capacity.21

Prevalence of Dementia in the United States: The Aging, Demographics, and Memory
Study, 29 NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 125, 128 (2007). For a broad discussion of the
characteristics of reversible, as well as irreversible, dementia, see Lois M. Brandriet &
Brian L. Thorn, Determining Capacity: Is Your Older Client Competent?, 14 UTAH B.J.
21, 22 (2001).
16. Fernandez, supra note 1. “Undue influence” is defined as “[t]he improper use of
power or trust in a way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s
objective.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1666 (9th ed. 2009).
17. See Fernandez, supra note 1.
18. Id. (“[This case] stands as an alarming illustration of the predicament that can
befall the elderly, no matter how prominent or well-off.”); see also E-mail from Ellen
McKissock, Esq., Hopkins & Carley, to author (Aug. 26, 2008, 04:29 PDT) (on file with
author) (indicating that eight out of twenty-four attorneys, who met in a small group in
northern California, felt that at least one of their clients had fallen victim to a marriage
solely for their assets). This Comment proposes a solution for California, but the problem
extends far beyond California. See, e.g., In re Hua Wang, 864 N.Y.S.2d 710, 716 (Sur.
Ct. 2008) (recognizing that without legislative change, New York’s current laws
“seemingly invite a plethora of surreptitious[] ‘deathbed marriages’”); infra Part V.A–B
(discussing both Texas’s proposal to solve the problem in that state and a scholar’s
suggestion for preventing incentives for deathbed marriages on a national level).
19. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.27 (West 2001). This Comment adopts this
definition of “elder.”
20. This problem logically extends to any individual who lacks capacity, not just an
elder. However, most offenses of abuse, neglect, and financial exploitation are especially
dangerous to the elderly population. See Seymour Moskowitz, Golden Age in the Golden
State: Contemporary Legal Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect, 36 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 589, 632 (2003). Elders are generally isolated from family and friends, and become
dependent on caretakers or strangers. See id. at 634. An assumption arises that elderly
individuals have large estates from years of accumulating wealth. See id. For these
reasons, elders likely fall prey more easily than other individuals to neglect and physical
and financial abuse. See id.
21. See Ellen McKissock, A New Use for Confidential Marriage: Elder Abuse,
CAL. TR. & EST. Q., Spring 2008, at 19, 19 (“The level of capacity for entering into a
marriage is so minimal that a lonely elder under the undue influence of another can
easily enter into matrimony without question from a clerk.”); infra Part III (explaining
the extremely low requirements for satisfying marital capacity). See generally Terry L.
Turnipseed, How Do I Love Thee, Let Me Count the Days: Deathbed Marriages in
America, 96 KY. L.J. 275 (2008), for a discussion of “deathbed marriages,” in which an
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Once in the relationship, it may prove difficult to dissolve the marriage
prior to the elder’s death.22 Marriages “may be exploitative and provide
a means of psychological, sexual, financial or social abuse.”23 A new
spouse can gain control over the elder through the ability to access the
elder’s financial information24 and the power to make healthcare
individual marries an elder or someone else who is about to die in order to financially
gain. This Comment addresses the capacity to marry, property consequences of marriage, and
the distinction between void and voidable marriages, just as Turnipseed does in his
article. See id. Turnipseed, however, ultimately “proposes a theoretical framework for a
model act giving heirs and beneficiaries standing to sue in order to negate the property
consequences that flow from marriage, depending on the level of mental capacity at the
time of the marriage.” Id. at 277. This Comment differs in that it raises the issues of property
consequences of marriage and the impact of void versus voidable marriages only as they
apply to California law. Also, this Comment proposes a premarriage solution rather than
one that comes into effect only after the elder dies. See infra Part V.B–C (discussing
Turnipseed’s proposal and the need for a predeath solution to the problem of financially
exploitative marriages).
For an international review of the problem, see generally Carmelle Peisah et al., Abuse
by Marriage: The Exploitation of Mentally Ill Older People, 23 INT’L J. GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY 883 (2008), which examines relevant cases from the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Canada. The marital capacity test proposed in this Comment was created
prior to accessing the international article, but both propose a very similar test,
suggesting that healthcare professionals administer a capacity examination prior to
marriage. See id. at 887; infra Part VI. However, this Comment mandates a capacity
test, infra Part VI, whereas the Australian article raises the issue merely “to promote
medical and community awareness of the vulnerability of older people with mental
disorder to abuse by marriage while highlighting the rights of older people to equity and
autonomy in personal relationships,” Peisah et al., supra, at 887.
22. First, an elder may continue to lack the capacity to recognize the relationship
the elder has with the “spouse” throughout the “marriage.” See In re Marriage of
Sawyer, No. A104303, 2004 WL 1834670, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004)
(“Sawyer’s mental functioning prior to and after the date of the marriage . . . showed
severe impairment in Sawyer’s ability to make decisions, to problem solve and to
understand the functional consequences of decisions and established that Sawyer was
vulnerable to coercion and abuse.”). Second, the elder may have trouble accessing the
court. See James S. Richardson, Sr., Aging and Its Impact on Court Systems, FED. LAW.,
July 2008, at 3. Lastly, it logically follows that a marriage can take place close enough
in time to an elder’s death that the elder dies before the issue is raised in court. See
Kristine S. Knaplund, The Right of Privacy and America’s Aging Population, 86 DENV.
U. L. REV. 439, 453 (2009).
23. Peisah et al., supra note 21, at 883.
24. See, e.g., Charles Pratt, Banks’ Effectiveness at Reporting Financial Abuse of
Elders: An Assessment and Recommendations for Improvements in California, 40 CAL.
W. L. REV. 195, 195 (2003). Prior to the enactment of section 15630.1 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code, effective January 1, 2007, situations such as the following
true story “depict[ed] a common form of elder abuse”:
A San Diego woman, referred to here as “B.,” in her late seventies, was
suffering early Alzheimer’s disease when a man in his mid-sixties, “T.,”
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decisions on the elder’s behalf—unless the elder specifies another
individual in a durable power of attorney for healthcare.25 The new
spouse then stands to inherit from the elder’s death.26
This Comment argues that California should require proof of an
elder’s marital capacity from an attending physician or mental health
professional to ensure protection of elders whose mental capacity has
declined to a point where they can no longer understand what marriage
entails. Part II explores the problem of financial elder abuse and
examines how it pertains to marriage in California. Part III explains the
levels of capacity required to enter into marriage, create testamentary
documents,27 and enter into binding contracts, and the reasons for these

introduced himself after he overheard that she was selling her condominium.
B. suffered a stroke during her first “date” with T. and was hospitalized. When
B. was released from the hospital, T. showed up unexpectedly and spirited her
off to Las Vegas where he married her. Immediately upon return from the
“honeymoon,” T. gained power of attorney in a meeting that B. cannot recall.
T. presented the power of attorney to B.’s bank, and then proceeded to join her
accounts. He used the net proceeds from the condo sale to purchase an
expensive motor home and car, to transfer money out of the country, to cash
B.’s social security checks, and to stash some of the money in a hidden bank
account. B.’s bank account showed frequent ATM withdrawals of the maximum
amount—from casinos. During much of this time B. and T. were not living
together; T. spent some of the money on a “girlfriend.” A marriage dissolution
proceeding forced the return of a portion of the money, but much of it was lost.
Id. (citing Telephone Interview with B. and her daughter (Jan. 13, 2003)). Section
15630.1 requires financial institutions to report suspected elder financial abuse. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15630.1 (West Supp. 2010). Reports of financial elder abuse by
financial institutions have increased since the passage of section 15630.1. James P.
Bessolo, Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Financial Elder Abuse, L.A. LAW., Oct.
2007, at 23, 27. In order to report, financial institutions look for warning signs such as
the following: changes in frequency or increasing amounts of account withdrawals;
different people accessing the elder’s accounts; the elder’s change in attitude towards
banking; and the elder’s reliance on another person. Id. at 26–27. For additional
warning signs and information on reporting requirements, see generally id.
Although financial institutions must now report suspected financial elder abuse,
logically some abuse will go unreported, leaving open a window for devastating harm to
unreported victims of elder abuse. See id. at 27. “By the time the abuse is discovered,
the abuser often will have dissipated the victim’s assets and elderly victims are often
unable to financially recover from their losses, which can lead to increased reliance on
public welfare programs, greater physical problems, and a higher mortality rate.” Id. at
24.
25. Joanna Lyn Grama, The “New” Newlyweds: Marriage Among the Elderly,
Suggestions to the Elder Law Practioner, 7 ELDER L.J. 379, 396, 399–402 (1999).
26. Id. at 384, 396; see infra Part IV.A.
27. “Testamentary” documents are documents “of or relating to a will.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (9th ed. 2009). In order to create a will, a person must meet a
requisite testamentary capacity, defined as “the ability to recognize the natural objects of
one’s bounty, the nature and extent of one’s estate, and the fact that one is making a plan
to dispose of the estate after death.” Id. at 235.
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capacity requirements. Part IV discusses procedural and statutory
safeguards from the law of trusts and estates. These safeguards are
aimed at protecting testamentary intent, but unfortunately, they may
inadvertently encourage financially exploitative marriages. Part V
details the statutory requirements for family members to challenge the
validity of an elder’s marriage. It also describes the inadequacies of
proposals that suggest that courts allow for postdeath litigation to
determine the elder’s capacity on the elder’s wedding day. Part VI
describes the elements of this Comment’s proposed marital capacity test
and finds that the test is constitutionally permissive.
II. ASSESSING THE PROBLEM OF FINANCIAL ELDER
ABUSE IN MARRIAGES
Society questions marriage between elders and markedly younger
persons.28 Such disapproval is undoubtedly the product of suspicions
into the motives behind the marriage. A new spouse who gains access to
the elder’s financial accounts can exploit the elder.29 Financial
exploitation occurs when a person improperly uses an elder’s funds in a
manner that is unethical, is unauthorized, or does not keep the elder in
mind.30 Financial abuse generally occurs as a systematic pattern over
months and years.31 California attorneys in the field of trust and estate
litigation recognize that their elderly clients often fall victim to

28. See, e.g., Fame and Infamy Surround Anna Nicole Smith, ABC NEWS, Nov. 17,
2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=1320909 (“[I]t was [Anna Nicole
Smith’s] marriage to Texas oil tycoon J. Howard Marshall that some say made her
infamous. When word got out that the love of Smith’s life was 63 years her senior,
many dismissed her as a gold digger.”); GREEDY (Imagine Entertainment 1994)
(portraying a family who worries that their rich uncle’s new nurse, who is young and
attractive, is “going to get everything [because t]hat’s the way these old guys are”).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 10; supra note 24.
30. Kathleen Schoen, Colorado Bar Association Builds Collaborations To Stop
Financial Abuse of the Elderly, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 107. Financial exploitation
is not limited to a new spouse acquiring assets but also includes adult children and
spouses of adult children who “care” for the vulnerable elder and gain access to
everything the elder owns. See Kymberleigh N. Korpus, Note, Extinguishing Inheritance
Rights: California Breaks New Ground in the Fight Against Elder Abuse but Fails To
Build an Effective Foundation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 543 (2001) (“90% of known
perpetrators of elder abuse are family members—two-thirds of them adult children or
spouses of adult children.”). This Comment, however, only focuses on a solution for
preventing financial elder abuse that stems from a new marriage.
31. Schoen, supra note 30, at 108.
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financially abusive marriages, suggesting that the current legislation is
unable to protect elders from financial abuse.32 These attorneys relay
that the elder’s new spouse is frequently someone who interacted with
the elder, such as a care provider or gardener, who could notice the
elder’s declining mental capacity.33
Financial abuse can occur during contrived marriages, as in Dills’s
case,34 or when a spouse dies intestate35 or without modifying existing
testamentary instruments after marriage, falling prey to the omitted
spouse statutes. 36 In California, if a person dies without a valid
testamentary instrument, the spouse stands to inherit anywhere from
one-third to the entire share of the decedent’s separate property37 and

32. See Knaplund, supra note 22, at 446; E-mail from Ellen McKissock to author,
supra note 18. Knaplund acknowledges that elders, like individuals of all ages, need
intimacy and companionship. Knaplund, supra note 22, at 439–40. Caregivers
in assisted living facilities, nursing homes, and in-home care situations throughout the
United States can take advantage of the elder through those needs. Id. at 442. The
California Legislature passed a protective statute that “rais[es] a presumption of undue
influence in cases where a caregiver is named in a will or other donative instrument.” Id.
at 446. As Knaplund notes, California’s protective statute “exempt[s] spouses, relatives,
and domestic partners of transferors, thus leaving an opening exploited by unscrupulous
caregivers.” Id. (footnote omitted). For a further discussion of California’s protective
statute, see infra Part IV.B.
33. See E-mail from Ellen McKissock to author, supra note 18.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 6–11.
35. A person can die without a valid testamentary document—intestate—for
several reasons, including but not limited to the following: a deliberate choice not to
make a will or trust due to hassle or expense, a revocation of an otherwise valid
testamentary document due to its loss or destruction, or the person’s death or
incapacitation prior to the creation of a testamentary document. ELIAS CLARK ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION,
TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 50 (5th ed. 2007).
Disappointed heirs often fight over a decedent family member’s estate, raising typical
postmortem challenges in probate court, generally claiming either (1) that the probate
court should not admit the decedent’s will because the testator lacked capacity, was
under undue influence at the time of the signing, or did not meet all of the necessary will
formalities; or (2) that the court should strike a particular provision of the will as void as
contrary to public policy—“a court [may] negate[] will provisions that are wasteful or
destructive in a way that harms surviving persons.” Judith G. McMullen, Keeping Peace
in the Family While You Are Resting in Peace: Making Sense of and Preventing Will
Contests, 8 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 61, 61–71 (2006).
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6401(c) (West 2009). The surviving spouse will receive
one-third of the decedent’s separate property if the decedent is survived by more than
one child, one child and issue—lineal descendents or offspring—of one or more
deceased children, or issue of two or more deceased children. Id.; see also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 908 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “issue”). The surviving spouse will
receive one-half of the decedent’s separate property if the decedent is survived by one
child or issue of one deceased child or by a parent or issue of the parent if none of the
decedent’s issue are then living. § 6401(c). Lastly, if the decedent spouse is not
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potentially all of the couple’s community property and quasi-community
property.38 Therefore, a person who marries an elder, or anyone near
death, stands to inherit substantial assets.39 The possibility for a
surviving spouse to inherit substantial assets presents an incentive to
commit elder abuse.40
A. The Prevalence of Financial Elder Abuse
As the elderly population increases due to the aging of the baby
boomer generation,41 financially exploitative marriage scams are likely
to increase. According to statistics, “[i]n 2030, when all of the baby
boomers will be 65 and older, nearly one in five U.S. residents is
expected to be 65 and older. This age group is projected to increase to
88.5 million in 2050, more than doubling the number in 2008 (38.7
million).”42 According to California’s Department of Aging, “the
elderly population [of California] is expected to grow more than twice as
fast as the total population . . . . The elderly age group will have an
overall increase of 112 percent during the period from 1990 to 2020.”43
survived by any of the above mentioned individuals, then the surviving spouse inherits
the entire share of separate property. Id.
38. Quasi-community property includes all personal property and all California
real property that either spouse or domestic partner owned while domiciled outside of
California that would have been characterized as community property if the spouse had
been domiciled in California when the property was acquired. See CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 66 (West 2009).
39. See infra Part IV.A. See generally Turnipseed, supra note 21 (recommending
a solution to the problem of financially driven deathbed marriages, which would prevent
a spouse from inheriting under either elective share or community property states).
40. See Steven Pietroforte, Legal Principles of Confidential Marriages and the
Potential for Abuse, 18 GLENDALE L. REV. 63, 65 (1999) (noting that California’s
confidential marriage and intestate statutes present an opportunity “for persons to
fraudulently obtain the estate of the sick and dying”); Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 300
(“The current incentives are off kilter. A greedy potential spouse has every incentive to
find a minister or officer of the law willing to marry them off to a wealthy sick person
and no legal incentives not to try it.”).
41. The baby boomer generation consists of individuals who were born between
1946 and 1964. Jon Pynoos et al., Aging in Place, Housing, and the Law, 16 ELDER L.J.
77, 79 (2008).
42. Press Release, Robert Bernstein & Tom Edwards, U.S. Census Bureau, An
Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury (Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.
census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/population/012496.html.
43. California Department of Aging, Statistics/Demographics—Facts About
California’s Elderly, http://www.aging.ca.gov/stats/fact_about_elderly.asp (last visited
Mar. 28, 2010). The U.S. Census Bureau in 2000 reported that nearly 3.6 million persons
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Of California’s elderly population, nearly 14% fall victim to some type
of elder abuse each year.44 Forty percent of these elderly victims suffer
from financial abuse.45
Dependency and capacity issues leave the elderly population
vulnerable and “more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and
abandonment,” including financial abuse, than other members of the
population.46 Fewer family members live near their elderly relatives
than in previous decades, increasing the likelihood of elders’ falling
victim to exploitative marriages and financial elder abuse.47 Neglect by
loved ones can lead an elder of questionable capacity to seek
companionship.48 Therefore, when no relatives live nearby, an elder can
easily become a victim of abuse by unscrupulous individuals.49

aged sixty-five and older live in California, accounting for almost 11% of California’s
population. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DP-1: PROFILE OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS:
2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: CALIFORNIA (2008), available at http://factfinder.census.gov/
(select “California” in the “state” information box and click on “go”; on the “Fact Sheet”
page, click on the “2000” tab).
44. RICHARD RYDER & CHERI JASINSKI, ELDER FINANCIAL ABUSE TASK TEAM
REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON AGING 3 (2005).
45. Id. In other words, almost 6% of elders in California fall victim to financial
elder abuse. Other types of elder abuse include physical abuse, psychological or mental
abuse, neglect, abandonment, abduction, and isolation. NAT’L CTR. ON ELDER ABUSE,
TYPES OF ELDER ABUSE IN DOMESTIC SETTINGS 1–2 (1999), http://www.ncea.aoa.gov/
ncearoot/Main_Site/pdf/basics/fact1.pdf.
46. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15600 (West 2001). Section 15610.07 defines
“‘[a]buse of an elder or a dependent adult’” as “[p]hysical abuse, neglect, financial
abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical
harm or pain or mental suffering.” Id. § 15610.07. See generally Lara Queen Plaisance,
Comment, Will You Still . . . When I’m Sixty-Four: Adult Children’s Legal Obligations to
Aging Parents, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 245, 246 (2008) (advocating a required
duty of care for adult children to look after an incapacitated parent).
47. See ELDER ABUSE: INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 3–4
(Jordan I. Kosberg & Juanita L. Garcia eds., 1995). Isolation and neglect of elderly
individuals is due to an increase in the mobility of family members who move away
from the elderly relative for employment and educational opportunities. Id. Economic
changes that encourage—or perhaps even require—female family members to work
outside of the home also increase the neglect of elders. Id. at 3.
48. See Knaplund, supra note 22, at 439–41, 455. The elderly, like all humans,
need intimacy and physical contact and such needs may actually increase as a person
grows older. Id. at 439–40. Knaplund asserts that “elderly people who lack family to
care for them at home face two tough choices. They can either stay in their homes and
retain a great deal of freedom over their personal affairs, or they can go to a facility,
where they may find their freedom severely restricted.” Id. at 441. If elders choose to stay in
their homes, “[t]he result in some cases is that the elderly are being taken advantage of
by unscrupulous caregivers, even in states that have legislation attempting to protect them.”
Id. at 442.
49. See supra note 47. See generally Knaplund, supra note 22 (comparing the
protection that an elder, who lacks a supportive family, receives when the elder lives in
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Financial elder abuse is especially troubling because it can avoid
detection for long periods of time.50 For example, a relationship that
leads to marriage can superficially appear to be a casual friendship or the
product of a person’s simply taking an interest in the care of an elder.
Third parties may not notice the influence a person has over the elder or
the steps taken to lure the elder into marriage. Therefore, states must
find a balance between protecting elders from financially exploitive
marriages and allowing them to exercise their fundamental right to enter
into marriage.51
B. California Marriage Statutes
The State of California regulates marital relationships by requiring
that both parties have capacity to marry and that the parties obtain a
marriage license and certificate.52 A couple must marry within ninety
days of obtaining a marriage license.53 The marriage license becomes a
marriage certificate when the person solemnizing the marriage registers
the license with the county clerk.54
either a nursing or assisted living facility versus the abuse that an elder faces when the
elder remains in the elder’s house).
50. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Domestic Settings,
in ELDER MISTREATMENT: ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION IN AN AGING AMERICA
382, 403 (Richard J. Bonnie & Robert B. Wallace eds., 2003). A familial relationship
between the elder and the abuser may eliminate suspicions of financial abuse because a
third party may presume that the elder victim voluntarily provided or consented to the
perpetrator’s obtaining the elder’s assets. Id. at 404. Additionally, an abuser can hide
signs of financial abuse, unlike in the case of physical abuse. Id.
51. The fundamental right to enter into marriage is “a right of marital and familial
privacy . . . [the right is not absolute, it] places some substantive limits on the regulatory
power of government” over marriage. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring); see infra Part VI.B. See generally Stephen L. Grose, A Constitutional
Analysis of Pennsylvania’s Restrictions Upon Marriage, 83 DICK. L. REV. 71 (1978)
(analyzing to what extent the state can infringe upon the personal freedom to marry);
Joseph A. Pull, Questioning the Fundamental Right To Marry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 21
(2006) (discussing the origins of, contradictions within, and reasons for the fundamental
right to marriage).
52. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 500.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); see also Estate of
DePasse, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 148 (Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the legislature’s role in
regulating marriage).
53. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 356, 504 (West 2004). It is the duty of the person
solemnizing the marriage to return the certificate to the county recorder’s office within
ten days of performing the ceremony. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 357(c), 506(c) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2009).
54. §§ 300, 500.5.
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In California, couples can marry either by public marriage,55 common
in all states, or through confidential marriage, which is specific to
California.56 California has recognized confidential marriage since
1878.57 At the time the legislature codified confidential marriage,
society considered it sinful for couples to live together before marriage.58
Despite society’s negative views on premarital cohabitation, many
couples living in rural parts of California chose to live in sin because
they simply could not reach a courthouse or member of the clergy
without great difficulty in order to formalize their union.59 Confidential
marriages encouraged men and women, who were already living
together, to enter into a legally recognized marriage without the couple’s
suffering the public embarrassment of having the actual marriage date
publicized.60 The couple’s neighbors and family members, or any other
person interested in the date of marriage, could not obtain the actual date
of the marriage because the record was sealed by the church.61 Thus,
55. See id. §§ 300–310.
56. Id. §§ 500–511. Michigan also offers a “secret” marriage option in order “to
protect a child born out of the indiscretions of its parents.” Baum v. Baum, 173 N.W.2d
744, 746 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.201 (West 2005).
Under the Michigan statute, couples can request a predated marriage certificate, which
keeps the actual marriage date hidden from disclosure. See Baum, 173 N.W.2d at 746.
57. See Act of Feb. 6, 1878, ch. 51, 1877–1878 Cal. Stat. 75, 75–76 (current
version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 500 (West 2004)). The text of the original statute reads as
follows:
When unmarried persons, not minors, have been living together as man and
wife, they may, without a license, be married by any clergyman. A certificate
of such marriage must, by the clergyman, be made and delivered to the parties,
and recorded upon the records of the church of which the clergyman is a
representative. No other record need be made.
Id.; see also People v. McIntire, 1 P.2d 443, 444 (Cal. 1931) (discussing the
requirements of the statute).
58. See GÖRAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR
COHABITATION 157–58 (2008). Lind explains that society accepted the common law
marriage ceremony in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because the frontier lifestyle of
early America made it difficult for couples to marry publicly. Id. Social reasons, such
as protecting the woman’s reputation and legitimizing children, encouraged marriage.
See id.
59. See Jill Wolfson, The Great Wedding War: Just Say ‘I Do,’ MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 23, 1983, at E3, available at 1983 WLNR 247205. Frontier living, sparse
transportation, and a limited number of clergymen made wedding ceremonies difficult if
not impossible. Id. Confidential marriages provided couples with the opportunity to
legitimize their relationship when an opportunity to marry before the clergyman presented
itself. Id.
60. McKissock, supra note 21, at 19; Pietroforte, supra note 40, at 63 (citing
Encinas v. Lowthian Freight Lines, Inc., 158 P.2d 575, 579 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945)).
61. See Encinas, 158 P.2d at 579. Today couples must record confidential marriages
with the county clerk, but the record remains sealed from public inspection. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 511 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
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confidential marriages furthered the public policy goal of encouraging
marriages and helped to legitimize children born out of wedlock.62
1. Distinctions Between Confidential and Public Marriages
A few rules distinguish the public and confidential marriage statutes.63
First, public marriages require the signature of at least one witness,
whereas confidential marriages do not require any witnesses.64 Second,
to engage in a confidential marriage, a couple must first live together as
husband and wife, although the statute does not specify the required
length of time a couple must live together before marrying.65 Third, it is
more difficult to confirm the existence of a confidential marriage
because the public cannot view confidential marriage records.66 A
family member or concerned friend can access a public marriage license

62. See Encinas, 158 P.2d at 579; McKissock, supra note 21, at 19. Unwed
parenthood and premarital cohabitation no longer carry the same stigma they did when the
state first recognized the confidential marriage statute. See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a
Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of
Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPPLEMENT 125, 132 (2006); see also Jennifer L. King,
Comment, First Comes Love, Then Comes Marriage? Applying Washington’s
Community Property Marriage Statutes to Cohabitational Relationships, 20 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 543, 555 (1997) (“Once the social mores against cohabitation were challenged
and society did not come to an end, the traditional reasons for placing cohabitation on a
level well below marriage may have lost relevance.”).
63. One distinction, which is no longer legally applicable today, is that a couple
marrying under the public statute had to appear at the county clerk’s office and file a
statement declaring their marital status—single or divorced—prior to the wedding. See
Family Law, Confidential Marriage Certificates, Cohabitation Contracts, Interlocutory
Judgment in Marriage Dissolution: Hearing Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary,
1979–1980 Leg. Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal. 1979) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Robert D.
Zumwalt, County Clerk, San Diego County). As early as 1981, the confidential marriage
statute allowed an exception to the appearance requirement for parties unable to appear
due to incarceration in prison or confinement to a healthcare facility. Act of Sept. 26,
1981, ch. 872, §§ 1–2, 1981 Cal. Stat. 3335, 3335–36. The legislature extended this
exemption to public marriages effective January 1, 2008. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 426
(West 2004 & Supp. 2009); infra text accompanying notes 73–77.
64. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 422(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (requiring that
one or more witnesses sign a public marriage certificate), with id. § 500 (West 2004)
(requiring only that the couple live together prior to marrying).
65. § 500. Case law indicates that a relationship of “occasional illicit intercourse,”
People v. McIntire, 1 P.2d 443, 444 (Cal. 1931), or of man and mistress will not suffice
to constitute a couple’s living together as husband and wife, see Sharon v. Sharon, 22
P. 26, 35 (Cal. 1889).
66. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 506, 511 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
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by mailing a request to the county clerk’s office.67 In contrast, the
county clerk may release a copy of a confidential marriage certificate
only to parties of the marriage or to third parties who obtain a court
order establishing “good cause.”68
Although distinctions exist between confidential and public marriages,
an unfortunate similarity exists between them: an insincere courter can
take advantage of an elder under either. After the death of either of the
spouses, a third party cannot challenge the marriage based on an elder’s
lack of capacity.69 If a family member does not know the elder is
married until after the elder dies, then the family cannot challenge the
marriage.70 Therefore, the confidential marriage option exacerbates the
problem of financial elder abuse carried out by marriage.71 Despite the
potential for abuse of the confidential marriage statute, the statute
continues to exist because some individuals wish to keep their marriage
certificates private to maintain some semblance of privacy in their
personal lives.72 Ironically, the same secrecy of marital records that
67. See, e.g., El Dorado County Recorder-Clerk, Marriage FAQs, http://www.co.
el-dorado.ca.us/countyclerk/faq_marriage.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). In El
Dorado County, for example, it takes two to three days after the county receives the
request for anyone to receive a certified copy of a public marriage. Id. A confidential
marriage certificate may also be mailed but it requires a signed affidavit by the couple
named on the certificate and it takes three to four weeks for the couple to receive a
certified copy. Id.
68. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 509, 511 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). See, e.g., David L.
Butler, County of San Diego, Assessor/Recorder/County Clerk, http://arcc.co.sandiego.ca.us/services/marriage_certificates.aspx (“If you had a confidential marriage
license, only the married parties named on the certificate may request a copy and they
will be required to show identification.”) (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). There is no
established definition of “good cause.” See, e.g., Zorrero v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 120 Cal. Rptr. 855, 858 (Ct. App. 1975) (“[I]ts definition varies with the context in
which it is used. Very broadly, it means a legally sufficient ground or reason for a
certain action.”).
69. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2210–2211 (West 2004); infra Part V.
70. See §§ 2210–2211; McKissock, supra note 21, at 20 (“In the case of a
confidential marriage, family members may never be aware that an incompetent elder
has married until after his or her death and a surviving spouse suddenly appears.”);
Pietroforte, supra note 40, at 65.
71. See supra notes 66–68, 70 and accompanying text.
72. Often celebrity couples try to keep their marriages private. In 1991, Janet
Jackson and her songwriter-boyfriend married in a secret wedding at their San Diego
home. Jackson’s Secret Marriage Ends, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/entertainment/772596.stm (“[Janet Jackson] had kept it private ‘in an effort to
have a normal family life.’”). Gary Coleman also engaged in a secret wedding. Gary
Coleman Reveals Secret Marriage, FOX NEWS, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.foxnews.
com/story/0,2933,330509,00.html?sPage=fnc/entertainment/celebcouples (“[Mrs. Coleman]
said they kept their wedding secret because she wanted to keep being seen as her own
person.”). Other couples may also wish to keep their marriages away from public
inspection for personal security reasons. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
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allows the occurrence of elder abuse also warrants the continued
existence of the statute.
2. Abuse of the Marriage Statutes
Under both marriage statutes, parties to the marriage must appear
together before the county clerk.73 However, exceptions are made for a
party74 who is physically unable to appear due to hospitalization,
incarceration, or any other reason a county clerk deems satisfactory.75
When the presence requirement of a party is excused, the person
solemnizing the marriage must submit an affidavit to the county clerk,
signed under penalty of perjury, stating the reasons the party could not
appear in person.76 Either a notary public or a court must authenticate
the signature of the person who is unable to appear prior to the issuance
of a marriage certificate.77

Opposition to Co-Trustees Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, In re Tollefsen, No.
PRO116118 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2008). Judges, policemen, and individuals worried about a
jealous ex-spouse or a stalker may all choose to have a confidential marriage to protect
their loved ones. Id. (citing County of Marin, Application for License and Certificate of
Confidential Marriage, available at http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/CC/Main/clerk/Forms/
m_app_conf.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (“A confidential marriage license is not a public
record. You may want a confidential marriage license if you are a celebrity, work in law
enforcement or have another confidentiality issue.”)). Online accessibility to documents that
form the public record makes it easier for wrongdoers to access a future victim’s personal
information. See generally Kristen M. Blankley, Note, Are Public Records Too Public?
Why Personally Identifying Information Should Be Removed from Both Online and Print
Versions of Court Documents, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 413, 418 (2004) (“The advent of the
Internet has greatly increased the incident rate of [identity theft]. Because the personally
identifying information in court documents is rarely removed before a document is
posted online, courts have created a substantial risk of identity theft for those whose
records are exposed to the public.” (footnotes omitted)); Kristen M. Driskell, Note,
Identity Confidentiality for Women Fleeing Domestic Violence, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S
L.J. 129, 131 (2009) (“[A]dvancing internet technologies and the release of personal
information by government agencies, courts, and corporations make it easier than ever
for an abuser to find and continue to abuse his victim.”).
73. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 359, 501 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
74. Technically, neither party has to appear. See infra note 75.
75. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 426(d), 502(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). As of the
writing of this Comment, there are no cases that assist in determining what the county
clerk might deem satisfactory.
76. Id. §§ 426(a)–(b), 502(a)–(b).
77. Id. §§ 426(c), 502(c).
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Abuse can occur despite the appearance requirement.78 For example,
Linda Lowney, an estate planning attorney in her fifties, and Thor
Tollefsen, her eighty-six-year-old client, appeared together in person
before the county clerk in order to marry confidentially.79 The couple
chose to marry under the confidential marriage statute because “Lowney
did not want anyone to know about the marriage, especially her 16-yearold daughter.”80 Both parties signed the confidential marriage license
and the deputy clerk married the couple.81 As with many elders, the
groom was lonely; he lived by himself and his only surviving relatives
lived in Norway.82 Even after signing the marriage license, the couple
continued to live in separate houses.83 Within a year of the marriage,
Tollefsen asked Lowney for a divorce; his relatives learned of his
marriage, as well as his unhappiness with it, at approximately the same
time.84 Tollefsen died before his family could help him with the divorce
proceedings, leaving him still “married” to Lowney when he died.85 Six
days after Tollefsen’s death, Lowney filed for a spousal property petition
in order to claim half of Tollefsen’s separate property assets—
approximately one million dollars.86 Fortunately, Lowney’s efforts
proved unsuccessful.87 The couple’s lack of premarital cohabitation
violated the confidential marriage statute, therefore, invalidating the
marriage.88
Although the surviving spouse’s attempt to claim a share of the
decedent’s separate property proved unsuccessful, the case illustrates the
ineffectiveness of appearing before the county clerk as a deterrent for
financially abusive marriages. Abuse occurs anytime an elder who lacks
capacity to understand the obligations and potential risks of marriage is
convinced to get married—either through a public or confidential
license. Confidential marriages remain particularly abusive because
family members and concerned third parties, who might otherwise help

78. McKissock, supra note 21, at 19.
79. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Summary
Judgment at 1, In re Tollefsen, No. PRO116118 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2008)
[hereinafter Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A.]; McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
80. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 1; see McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
81. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 1; see McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
82. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 1; see McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
83. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 1; see McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
84. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 1; see McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
85. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 1; see McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
86. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 1; see McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
87. E-mail from Ellen McKissock to author, supra note 18.
88. Id.
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to protect their elder loved one, have difficulty obtaining information
regarding the marriage.89
Furthermore, some individuals with statutory authority to solemnize
marriages do not have the training or experience necessary to determine
the capacity of a marital applicant.90 The county clerk may appoint
deputy commissioners to solemnize marriages.91 A friend or relative
may serve as a deputy commissioner for a wedding provided the friend
or relative attends a fifteen- to twenty-minute instruction on how to
perform the service.92 A person trying to abuse the marriage system could
easily use a friend, serving as a deputy commissioner of civil marriage,
to solemnize the marriage. In the case of a friend or relative solemnizing
the marriage, the personal relationship between the person seeking to
financially exploit the elder and the deputy commissioner indicates that
the deputy commissioner likely could not fairly or honestly judge capacity.
This is because the deputy commissioner either lacks the training for
such a determination or has a potential personal bias or motive.
Therefore, it is possible that marriages can occur despite one of the
parties’ lacking capacity.
III. DETERMINING CAPACITY
Under Anglo-American law, a person must meet a specified level of
understanding—“soundness of mind”—to enter into legal agreements or
relations.93 On a basic scale, marital capacity requires the least amount
of capacity, followed by testamentary capacity, and lastly, capacity to
89. See McKissock, supra note 21, at 20; Pietroforte, supra note 40, at 65; supra
notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
90. The list of persons able to solemnize a marriage is available at CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 400 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). The list includes, but is not limited to, judges, a commissioner
of civil marriages, and an “authorized person of any religious denomination.” Id.
91. CAL. FAM. CODE § 401 (West 2004).
92. See, e.g., El Dorado County, Deputy Commissioner of Marriage Program,
http://www.co.el-dorado.ca.us/countyclerk/deputy.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); County
of Alameda, Volunteer Deputy Marriage Commissioner Program, http://www.acgov.org/
auditor/clerk/commissioners.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (requiring only that
applicants are over the age of eighteen, able to read and write English, and have a personal
commitment to the county and serving others). For a list of counties that allow friends or
family members to serve as deputy commissioners, see Sheri & Bob Stritof, Deputy for a
Day Program in California: A Member of Your Family or a Friend Can Perform Your
Marriage Ceremony, ABOUT.COM: MARRIAGE, http://marriage.about.com/od/california/
qt/deputyforaday.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
93. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 235–36 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “capacity”).
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enter into contracts.94 The level of understanding required depends on
the complexity of the act or task at hand.95 In California, a person has
marital capacity and is, therefore, able to consent to marriage if that
person is capable of understanding the nature of marriage and the
obligations it creates.96 In keeping with the fundamental right to marry,
the low level of capacity required allows the majority of individuals to
marry.97 For example, a person under a conservatorship98 is generally
without contractual power but may validly create a will or marry in
California.99 Another textbook example is that courts may find a
marriage valid even if the court deems the decedent’s will, signed the
day after the marriage, invalid due to the decedent’s lack of capacity.100
The problem rests not with the low level capacity required to marry, but
rather in the fact that the statutory requirement of consent is not
effectively enforced.101

94. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 145–46 (7th ed. 2005);
see Lawrence A. Frolik & Mary F. Radford, “Sufficient” Capacity: The Contrasting
Capacity Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAELA J. 303, 304–05 (2006);
Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 286.
95. Frolik & Radford, supra note 94, at 304. Some advocate a standard one-sizefits-all capacity requirement for all transactions, but imposing different standards of
capacity based on the transaction is necessary because different tasks have different levels of
consequences. Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests
of Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 326 (2003). Beyond
marital, testamentary, and contractual capacity, a person must also have enough capacity
when deciding whether to forego medical treatment. Id. at 326–27. The patient must
have enough capacity to be “aware of his physical condition and the likely result of the
decision to forego medical treatment.” Id. at 326. Along the lines of healthcare decisionmaking,
appointing an agent under a durable power of attorney requires contractual capacity because
the appointed agent is given immediate, life-impacting decisionmaking capability. Frolik &
Radford, supra note 94, at 313.
96. Dunphy v. Dunphy, 119 P. 512, 512 (Cal. 1911) (“The true test in actions to
annul a marriage on account of insanity at the time of the marriage . . . is whether the
party was capable of understanding the obligations assumed by marriage.” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Marriage is often referred to as a “special
kind of contract” that warrants certain rights under state law and creates obligations
between the parties involved. GAIL KOFF, LOVE AND THE LAW 74 (1989).
97. See Knaplund, supra note 22, at 447 (“Today, given the fundamental right to
marry, states have proceeded cautiously in restricting the rights of incompetent people to
marry . . . .”); infra Part VI.B.
98. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 12, at 273; Ross, supra note 12, at 758.
99. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1900–1901 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); McKissock,
supra note 21, at 19; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 94, at 145–46.
100. Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064, 1068–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
101. See McKissock, supra note 21, at 19 (“The county clerk is not required to
verify any statements on the confidential marriage license, which statements are quite
often not even made under penalty of perjury.”).
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A. Marital Capacity Requirements
In California, both parties must have capacity in order to marry.102 A
diagnosis of a physical or mental disorder does not equate to a lack of
marital capacity and, therefore, does not automatically prevent an
individual from getting married.103 A judge will only determine that an
individual lacks marital capacity if the individual has a deficit in one or
more mental functions that “significantly impairs the person’s ability to
understand and appreciate the consequences” of marriage.104 The court
finds deficient mental functioning when an individual lacks the ability to
reason logically, concentrate, recall information, understand when
communicating with others, or maintain organized thoughts.105
In addition to requiring that marriage applicants have a requisite
mental capacity to marry, social and ethical standards require that both
parties reach a statutorily imposed age before marrying.106 The minimum
age requirement, however, has changed over time and throughout
jurisdictions. Under common law the courts considered individuals
capable of consenting to marriage based simply on the age of sexual
maturity.107 Therefore, a female could validly marry at the age of twelve
and a male could enter into marriage upon reaching the age of
fourteen.108 Likewise, California sets the age requirement for entering
into a marital relationship at eighteen109 but allows exceptions for minors
to marry who obtain consent from each underage person’s parent or who
receive court approval.110 Allowing minors to marry is particularly
applicable for the case of unwed minor parents because the state
maintains an interest in protecting the legitimacy of any children born of

102. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). A denial of a marriage
license occurs when “either of the applicants lacks the capacity to enter into a valid
marriage or is, at the time of making the application for the license, under the influence
of an intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug.” Id. § 352 (West 2004).
103. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 810 (West 2002).
104. Id. § 811(b).
105. For a complete list of what constitutes deficient mental functions, see id.
§ 811(a).
106. LIND, supra note 58, at 187.
107. Id. at 191.
108. Id. Persons under those ages could still marry, but marriages between minors
under the age of seven were considered void, as if they had never happened. Id.
109. CAL. FAM. CODE § 301 (West 2004).
110. Id. §§ 302–303 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
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the marriage.111 States seemingly impose arbitrary marital capacity
standards by assuming that a person meets a certain level of capacity
once an individual meets physical maturity112 or a minimum age.113
A person’s chronological age, after all, does not necessarily reflect
that person’s “mental age” or ability to comprehend the nature of the
marital act.114 As a person ages, it becomes “more likely that he or she
may suffer from diminished capacity.”115 Studies reveal that although
less than 1% of persons under the age of sixty-five suffer from dementia,
the percentage of individuals exhibiting symptoms of dementia
significantly increases after age sixty-five.116 In fact, approximately
45% of eighty-five-year-olds suffer from dementia.117 Federal and state
governments recognize the vulnerability of elders and, therefore, pass
laws aimed at caring for, and protecting, elders.118 For example, the
California Legislature passed legislation aimed at protecting elders from
abuse, neglect, and abandonment.119 The state, therefore, should
acknowledge that elders may lack capacity to marry just as minors lack
capacity and should adopt legislation that protects elders entering into
marriage.
B. Reasons for Capacity Requirements
Capacity requirements allow states to simultaneously balance
individual autonomy120 with protection of incapacitated persons.121
111. See Encinas v. Lowthian Freight Lines, Inc., 158 P.2d 575, 579 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1945). Similarly, Michigan provides a statutory exception to the age requirement
for marital capacity. See supra note 56.
112. An individual reaches physical maturity when that person has the ability to
consummate the marriage or become pregnant.
113. When the states recognized twenty-one as the age of majority, the age of
determining testamentary capacity was set at the same age. Frolik & Radford, supra
note 94, at 306. Today, eighteen years of age is widely recognized as the age of majority
and most states, therefore, recognize it as the minimum age for testamentary capacity.
Id. Statutorily reducing the age of majority by three years—and consequently the age of
capacity to devise property—suggests the arbitrariness in the age requirement. See id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Brandriet & Thorn, supra note 15, at 22; Sherrill Y. Tanibata, Mind over
Matters: The Question of an Elder’s Legal Capacity Nearly Always Involves Issues of
Fraud and Undue Influence, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 28, 30.
117. See sources cited supra note 116.
118. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 12, at 273 (“Federal and state laws against
age discrimination, pension and social security law, and many other fields of law touch
directly or indirectly on the problems of those who are middle-aged or older.”).
119. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15600 (West 2001).
120. Individual autonomy includes, but is not limited to, a person’s freedom to
contract, marry, and bequeath one’s estate.
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Requiring that an individual meet a minimal level of capacity to enter
into marriage indicates that society highly values the individual’s
decision to marry and that the state endorses marriage.122 In order to
preserve the legitimacy of the institution of marriage, the state must
ensure that individuals knowingly and willingly enter into marriage.123
Similar to an elder unduly influenced to sign a testamentary document,
an elder who lacks the full understanding of marital consequences
cannot rationally enter into a marriage because the choice to marry is
essentially taken out of the elder’s hands.124 Therefore, if California
continues to avoid addressing the problem of individuals’ conning elders
into financially exploitative marriages, then California is arguably
complicit in devaluing the institution of marriage.
Additionally, mental capacity requirements “may protect a senile or
incompetent [individual] from exploitation by cunning persons.”125 The
law of trusts and estates acknowledges that “[i]f the incompetent could
make wills, then many institutionalized people would be subject to
imposition by the unscrupulous.”126 States maintain an interest in
preventing incompetent persons from entering into binding contracts or
making irrevocable lifetime gifts that could leave an incompetent

121. See e.g., Brandriet & Thorn, supra note 15, at 21 (noting that society highly
values independent decisionmaking by those with the capacity to make sound decisions);
Rebecca Dresser, Research Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Review of
Policy Issues and Proposals, in 2 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH
INVOLVING PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING
CAPACITY: COMMISSIONED PAPERS 5, 9 (1999), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/
nbac/capacity/volumeii.pdf (“A judgment that a capable person is incapable of exercising
autonomy is disrespectful, demeaning, and stigmatizing to that individual. Conversely, a
judgment that an incapable person is capable leaves that individual unprotected and
vulnerable to exploitation by others.”); Knauer, supra note 95, at 327–28 (discussing the
need to balance individual autonomy, states’ interests, and care for those with diminished
capacity).
122. See Knauer, supra note 95, at 328–29; supra notes 94, 96–99 and
accompanying text.
123. This idea applies similarly to the law of trusts and estates because “the public
acceptance of law rests upon a belief that legal institutions, including inheritance, are
legitimate, and legitimacy cannot exist unless decisions are reasoned.” DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 94, at 147. A testamentary instrument procured by undue influence does
not represent the testator’s true intent. See id. at 148. Therefore, society cannot accept such
an “irrational” representation of the testator’s intent. Id. The will cannot be probated, meaning it
cannot be brought before the court for establishing its validity. See id.; supra note 35.
124. See supra note 123.
125. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 94, at 148.
126. Id.

247

individual—as well as that individual’s dependents—impoverished and,
therefore, dependent on the state.127 Protecting incompetent elders from
unscrupulous individuals extends beyond protecting them from financial
insecurity; states also have an interest in protecting elders from
abandonment, neglect, and physical abuse.128 In other words, states
maintain an interest in protecting vulnerable elders, but California fails
to protect them from exploitative marriages.129
IV. INHERITANCE RIGHTS AND MARRIAGE
States generally uphold testamentary freedom.130 States will, however,
override a testamentary instrument, or provisions therein, if (1) the
provisions of the testamentary instrument violate public policy,131
(2) heirs or potential beneficiaries successfully challenge the validity of
the testamentary instrument,132 or (3) such overriding is necessary in
order to prevent unscrupulous individuals, who attempt to procure a
share of the decedent’s estate, from profiting from their wrongdoing.133
Additionally, the California Legislature created statutes that override

127. See id. at 145 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (2003)). Therefore, capacity requirements for making a gift,
financial investment, or contract all require contractual capacity, the highest level of
capacity on the capacity hierarchy. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The
required capacity to create a will is lower because the testator will no longer be alive and
in need of the money devised by the testamentary instrument. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 94, at 145–46.
128. CAL. WELF. & INST. § 15600 (West 2001).
129. See supra note 32.
130. See Frolik & Radford, supra note 94, at 305; McMullen, supra note 35, at 78.
States encourage testamentary freedom for individuals to choose to whom and in what
amounts they want their property distributed at death; a testator’s legal authority to
devise property at death encourages the testator to accumulate wealth during life. Frolik
& Radford, supra note 94, at 305. The ability to devise one’s property also encourages
family members to care for and to support their aging parents; family members who want
to inherit will likely pay more attention to the testator in an effort to remain in favor. Id.
131. McMullen, supra note 35, at 64–66.
132. Id. at 66–71. Challenges as to the validity of a testamentary instrument include
whether the instrument met all of the formal requirements of a will, whether the testator
lacked testamentary capacity during the signing of the instrument, and whether the
testator was unduly influenced to sign the document. Id.
133. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 250 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting
inheritance of individuals “who feloniously and intentionally kill[ed] the decedent”); id.
§ 259 (West 2002) (deeming persons held liable for committing elder abuse as
predeceasing the decedent so that such persons may not inherit damages awarded to the
decedent’s estate in the elder abuse action); id. § 21350 (West Supp. 2009) (requiring
extra precautions for deathtime transfers to certain individuals who are the most likely to
unduly influence the testator). However, these statutes only protect the testator’s property
interests after the testator dies.
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testamentary intent in order to protect the decedent’s surviving spouse
from unintentional disinheritance.134 This Part explains how the statutes
designed to protect the decedent’s family may actually encourage
individuals to sidestep legislative measures intended to protect the decedent.
A. Probate Statutes Designed To Protect the
Decedent’s Family
The institution of marriage serves to foster a partnership between
spouses with regard to property.135 States, therefore, regulate the
distribution of property during a marriage and upon the death of one of
the spouses or divorce.136 Based on the presumption of married couples
as partners, it logically follows that a new spouse, added to the elder’s
bank account, may withdraw from the elder’s account and use the elder’s
money for personal benefit—to the detriment of the elder.137 Then upon
the elder spouse’s death, the surviving spouse may inherit from the
decedent elder through a devise in the elder’s testamentary instruments,
through an omitted spouse statute,138 or by intestate succession.139 A
new spouse’s ability to inherit property upon the elder’s death justifies
using similar procedural safeguards as those found in the law of trusts
and estates.140
In California, a community property state,141 a surviving spouse stands
to inherit from the decedent spouse, even if the decedent executed a will

134. Id. § 21610 (ensuring a surviving spouse receives a share of the decedent’s
estate if the spouse is inadvertently omitted from the testator’s will); see In re Estate of
Katleman, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 477 (Ct. App. 1993) (upholding spouse’s right to receive
an omitted spouse share despite the decedent’s intent to disinherit her).
135. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways To End a Marriage: Divorce or
Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227 (discussing the partnership theory of marriage, including the
effects of death and divorce on property).
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 24, at 195; supra text accompanying notes 6–11.
138. § 21610.
139. Id. § 6401 (West 2009). See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.
140. See infra Parts IV.B, V. Examining an elder’s capacity to enter into marriage
merely would provide the same procedural safeguards as those preventing the inheritance
of property by fraud and undue influence. See infra Part IV.B.
141. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2004). The other community property states
include the following: Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington,
and Wisconsin. Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 277 n.16. A surviving spouse stands to
inherit from a decedent spouse regardless of whether the death occurs in a state that
follows an elective share regime or a state that follows a community property regime. Id.
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that does not name the surviving spouse as a beneficiary.142 Under the
California Probate Code’s omitted spouse statute, a surviving spouse
who is not provided for by the deceased spouse’s will may receive the
decedent’s share of both community property and quasi-community
property.143 The omitted spouse is also entitled to a share of the
decedent’s separate property equivalent in value to the amount the
spouse otherwise would have received had the decedent died intestate.144
Thus, the surviving spouse may inherit even if the decedent spouse dies
with a valid will if that will was executed prior to the marriage and does
not reference the new spouse.145
This rule of automatic inheritance for a new surviving spouse is not
without exceptions, however.146 A surviving spouse will not inherit
under California’s omitted spouse statute if the decedent’s testamentary
instruments clearly indicate the decedent’s intent not to provide for the
surviving spouse, if evidence suggests that the decedent made other
arrangements to provide for the surviving spouse,147 or if the surviving
spouse signed a premarital or antenuptial agreement or otherwise
acknowledged an agreement not to partake in the decedent’s estate.148
None of these exceptions to the omitted spouse statute would prevent an
individual from inheriting from an elder who lacks marital capacity. An
individual who lacks marital capacity lacks the higher levels of
testamentary and contractual capacity and, therefore, cannot validly
execute testamentary instruments to disinherit the surviving spouse or
enter into premarital or antenuptial agreements.149
Both the foregoing omitted spouse statute and the community property
regime protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance. Public policy
dictates that both the surviving spouse and certain surviving children150
at 277–79. Elective share states allow a surviving spouse to circumvent the distribution in an
otherwise valid will by choosing to inherit a statutorily defined elective share instead of
from the will. Id. at 278.
142. See § 21610.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. § 21611.
147. Such evidence can include proof of lifetime gifts or outside transfers.
148. § 21611.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 93–100.
150. If the decedent left out a living child, either because the child was born or
adopted after the execution of the testamentary instrument or because the decedent never
learned of the child’s birth or mistakenly thought the child to be dead, the child shall
receive a share as if the decedent died without executing the testamentary document. See
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21620–21622 (West Supp. 2009) (articulating instances in which an
omitted child can inherit and providing exceptions to the foregoing general rule).
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be protected against an “oversight, accident, mistake, or unexpected
change of condition,” which causes omission from a will.151 However,
nothing in the omitted spouse statute or other California statutes protects
an elder or the elder’s family from the “unexpected change of condition”
of an elder’s being manipulated into marrying. To the contrary, in
protecting the surviving spouse, the omitted spouse statute and the
intestacy statute seemingly provide incentive for an individual to prey on
the loneliness and diminished capacity of an elder.152 These statutes
allow the surviving spouse to benefit, by way of inheritance, from the
elder spouse’s death contrary to public policy goals of protecting the
elder and the elder’s family.153 Furthermore, these statutes prevent the
effectuation of the decedent’s testamentary intent because the elder
testator’s choices of to whom and in what amounts the elder wants to
distribute personal property at death are disrupted by an automatic share
going to the surviving spouse.154
B. California Protects Elders’ Deathtime Property Transfers
Courts closely scrutinize donative intent when a testator chooses to
bequeath the entire estate, or large amounts of it, to someone outside of
the testator’s immediate family.155 Reasonably, such transfers appear
suspicious and hint of possible fraud, undue influence, or financial
exploitation.156 To protect testators from these evils, the California
Legislature enacted section 21350 of the California Probate Code,157

151. In re Estate of Katleman, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 477 (Ct. App. 1993).
152. See supra notes 40, 46–49 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 37–40, 127 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.
155. CLARK ET AL., supra note 35, at 198. Courts scrutinize transfers to persons
outside of the testator’s family because courts favor inheritance as a system of reciprocity.
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 94, at 146–47 (explaining that inheritance is an
“economic incentive” for family members to care for their aging relatives).
156. See Graham v. Lenzi, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407, 411 (Ct. App. 1995) (“In enacting
sections 21350 and 21351, the Legislature was aware that certain individuals are uniquely
positioned to procure gifts from elderly persons through fraud, menace, duress or undue
influence.”).
157. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (West Supp. 2009); Suzanne E. Luna, Financial
Crimes Against the Elderly: Bernard v. Foley, PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 35, 37.
The California Legislature passed section 21350 in response to an infamous scandal that
involved an attorney who frequented a retirement community, well-known for its
wealthy residents, where he then drafted testamentary documents for the residents. Id.
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which prohibits donative transfers by will or revocable trust—with a few
exceptions158—to the following individuals: the drafter of the
testamentary instrument; any employees, relatives, or business partners
of the drafter; and individuals who have a fiduciary relationship with the
transferor.159 After the Trusts and Estates Section of the State Bar of
California160 had notified the legislature of a “rise in the number of
unscrupulous in-home caregivers and agencies,”161 the legislature added
care custodians of the transferor to the list of individuals prohibited from
receiving donative transfers.162
A transferor may avoid the prohibitory effects of section 21350 if an
independent attorney reviews the intended transfer with the transferor
and determines that donative intent exists.163 The attorney must find the
transferor’s decision is free from “fraud, menace, duress, or undue
influence.”164 The independent attorney must sign a certificate of

Through these documents the attorney bequeathed millions of dollars to himself and the
partners at his firm. Id.
158. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351 (West Supp. 2009). This prohibitive statute
allows for the following exceptions: the transferor obtains a court order approving the
transfer; a court determines after clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not
a product of fraud, menace, undue influence, or duress; the transfer is to a blood relation
by at least five familial degrees; or the transferor was not only a nonresident of
California but also signed the instrument outside of California. Id. The evidence that the
transfer was not a product of fraud, menace, undue influence, or duress must include
more than the testimony of the disqualified person. Id. Transfers of less than $3000 will
not trigger the prohibitive effects of the statute. Id. § 21351(h).
159. See id. § 21350.
160. Established in 1976 as the Estate Planning, Trust & Probate Section,
membership in the section “includes more than 5,000 attorneys” and covers fields of “Estate
Planning, Income and Transfer Taxes, Trust and Estate Administration, Litigation, Incapacity
(including Conservatorship, Guardianship, and Elder Law), and Ethics.” The State Bar
of California: Trusts and Estates Section, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_
generic.jsp?cid=10705&id=7066 (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
161. Luna, supra note 157, at 37.
162. See § 21350. This addition, although well-meaning, created confusion and
concern as to who qualifies as a care custodian. Luna, supra note 157, at 38. California
defines “care custodian” as “an administrator or an employee of . . . public or private
facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services for elders or dependent
adults.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.17 (West 2001 & Supp. 2010). Longtime friends
and other nonprofessionals who provide healthcare services on an informal basis to the elder
or dependant adult also fall under the care custodian category of section 21350. See Bernard
v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1206 (Cal. 2006). A further discussion of the interpretation of
the statute by the California courts is beyond the scope of this Comment, but the
legislation itself reveals the potential financial exploitation facing elders in California
from “unscrupulous” in-home caregivers. See Knaplund, supra note 22, at 446; see also
supra note 32 and text accompanying notes 32–33.
163. § 21351(b).
164. Id.
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independent review and deliver it to the transferor in order to validate
the transfer.165
Despite the safeguard of prohibiting deathtime transfers to certain
individuals, a beneficiary can simply bypass the statutory protection by
marrying or cohabitating with the transferor.166 An individual may use fraud
or undue influence to entrap a lonely, incapacitated elder into marriage.167
Once married, the new spouse gains access to the elder’s money both
during the elder’s lifetime and by inheritance at the elder’s death.168
The “marriage” of Thor Tollefsen to his estate planning attorney,
Linda Lowney, highlights the ineffectiveness of section 21350 as a
safeguard against undue influence and fraud.169 Tollefsen told his family
that he had agreed to marry Lowney because “‘that’s what she
wanted.’”170 Lowney befriended the lonely elder and, during his lifetime,
he gave her gifts amounting to nearly $350,000.171 Upon Tollefsen’s
death, Lowney waited only six days to file a petition for her right in
Tollefsen’s separate property.172 It seems highly probable that Lowney
attempted to marry Tollefsen for the sole purpose of bypassing section
21350, which would otherwise have barred her from inheriting anything
he might have devised to her in a will that she drafted.
A gaping loophole clearly exists in the protective measure established
by section 21350.173 Under current law, an attorney or a caretaker can
con an incapacitated, elderly individual into marriage. Once married,
the individual procures inheritance rights that the statute would have
otherwise prohibited the individual from receiving.

165. Id.
166. See id. § 21351(a) (exempting spouses, cohabitants, and registered domestic
partners from the list of individuals prohibited from receiving deathtime property transfers
from the decedent). For the purposes of this exemption, “cohabitant” is defined as “two
unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some
permanency of relationship,” whose relationship includes some of the following list of
nonexhaustive factors: “(1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same
living quarters, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property,
(4) whether the parties hold themselves out as husband and wife, (5) the continuity of the
relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700 (West 2009).
167. See supra notes 1–3, 16–17 and accompanying text.
168. See supra Part IV.A.
169. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
170. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A., supra note 79, at 6.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 1.
173. See supra notes 32, 166 and accompanying text.
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V. THE INADEQUACIES OF OTHER APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
As with other states, California attempts to promote a decedent’s
testamentary intent.174 California disturbs testamentary intent by prohibiting
certain deathtime transfers175 and by ensuring that a decedent’s surviving
spouse is not unintentionally disinherited.176 However, the legislature
essentially undermines these statutory prohibitions by failing to protect
incapacitated elders from entering financially exploitative marriages and
allowing wrongdoers to benefit from either the omitted spouse statute or
the intestacy statute.177 An elder who lacks marital capacity does not
understand the nature and consequences of marriage, lacks testamentary
intent, and, therefore, cannot understand that the surviving spouse will
inherit from the elder’s estate.178 Families or other concerned parties
who want to prevent a surviving spouse from inheriting must seek a
declaration that the marriage is either void or voidable, depending on the
basis for the challenge and when it is raised.179
On the one hand, if a court declares a marriage void, then the marriage
is considered to have never existed.180 Only incestuous, bigamous, and
nonlicensed marriages fit into the category of void marriages.181 No
statute of limitations exists to bar the declaration of a void marriage.182
174. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Public policy favors the
implementation and enforcement of prohibitory statutes—such as the ones in
California—that discourage potential heirs or beneficiaries from abusing or unduly
influencing testators. See generally Anne-Marie Rhodes, Consequences of
Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975 (2007)
(discussing a national movement towards disinheriting heirs and beneficiaries who engage in
misconduct or harm against the decedent, such as adultery, murder, abandonment, and
abuse). In order to protect elders but also ensure their testamentary intent when
determining shares of inheritance, probate judges must consider factors such as the
misconduct of an heir or beneficiary, protection of the vulnerable elderly population, and
other public policy concerns such as family privacy and judicial efficiency. See id. at
990–91.
176. See supra Part IV.A.
177. See supra Part IV.A.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 94, 149, 154.
179. See infra notes 180–88 and accompanying text.
180. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 3.1, at 126–27 (2d. ed. 1988); Mark Strasser, Harvesting the Fruits of
Gardiner: On Marriage, Public Policy, and Fundamental Interests, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 179, 210 n.226 (2003) (“‘A major difference between a void marriage and a
voidable marriage is that the latter is treated as valid and binding until its nullity is
ascertained and declared by a competent court, whereas the former does not require such
a judgment.’” (quoting Flaxman v. Flaxman, 273 A.2d 567, 569 (N.J. 1971))); Turnipseed,
supra note 21, at 280.
181. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2200–2201 (West 2004); Estate of DePasse, 118 Cal. Rptr.
2d 143, 151 (Ct. App. 2002) (declining to validate a “marriage” that occurred without a
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On the other hand, if a court declares a marriage voidable, then the
court finds that the marriage did exist but was invalid; the law treats the
parties to the voidable marriage as unmarried, including for purposes of
inheritance.183 A court may declare a marriage voidable if the couple
married as a result of force or fraud by one of the parties or if one of the
parties lacked marital capacity.184 Time limitations apply for when a
party may bring a suit to challenge a marriage as voidable.185 In order
for the court to declare a marriage voidable based on one spouse’s lack
of capacity, “a relative or conservator of the party of unsound mind”
must challenge the marriage “before the death of either party.”186 This
time limitation minimizes the family’s ability to prevent the surviving
spouse from inheriting because if a family does not challenge the
validity of the elder’s marriage until after the elder dies,187 then the
family must prove that the marriage was void from its inception in order
to prevent the surviving party from inheriting.188
The void versus voidable distinction is particularly troubling in the
context of confidential marriage because the lack of publicly recorded
marriage certificates makes it easier for an individual to hide the

license). The ability to void a marriage exists “in order to terminate relationships clearly
violating public policy.” CLARK, supra note 180, at 127 (1988).
182. See §§ 2200–2201.
183. See id. § 2212; CLARK, supra note 180, at 127. Voidable marriages remain
valid until someone challenges the marriage. Strasser, supra note 180, at 210. If no one
ever challenges the marriage as voidable, then it remains valid. Id. Essentially, voidable
marriages imply that “as long as a couple is satisfied with their marriage, the jurisdictions are
too and will continue to recognize its validity.” Id. at 211.
184. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210 (West 2004). The statute also lists the following
as grounds for voidable marriage: incurability of a physical incapacity, being under the
age to legally give consent, and certain instances of bigamy—wherein the challenging
party did not know of the spouse’s prior marriage or thought the former spouse was
deceased. Id. A marriage cannot be declared voidable if the couple freely cohabitated
with each other after recognizing the impediment to the marriage. Id.
185. See id. § 2211. A party to the marriage, who is not of legal age to marry, must
raise a challenge to the validity of the marriage “within four years after arriving at the
age of consent”; if a “parent, guardian, conservator, or other person having charge” of a
minor brings a challenge, the challenge must be brought prior to the minor’s reaching the
age of majority. Id. § 2211(a). A four-year statute of limitations also applies for
marriages “consented” to on the basis of fraud or force. Id. § 2211(d)–(e).
186. Id. § 2211(c).
187. Presumably the family does not challenge the marriage until after the elder dies
because the family does not discover the marriage until the surviving spouse files a
spousal petition.
188. See McKissock, supra note 21, at 20.
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marriage from the elder’s family.189 This reduces the likelihood that
family members will know of the marriage in time to challenge it before
the elder’s death. It follows that family members may not question the
occurrence of a marriage. If a person moves in with the elder, the family
may assume the elder’s new “housemate” is merely a caretaker.
Unfortunately, even if an elder’s family learns of a marriage only after
the elder dies, the family cannot challenge the marriage based on
incapacity because once the elder dies, a family member can only seek
to declare a marriage void and not voidable.190
In the event of an unsuccessful challenge to a marriage, under either
the void or voidable statute, then the marriage remains valid and a
surviving spouse remains able to claim a share in intestacy or pursuant to
the omitted spouse statute.191 Also, unless the elder’s family can
successfully challenge the marriage, the family cannot bring a cause of
action for financial elder abuse against the surviving spouse.192 The
surviving spouse, therefore, benefits financially from the decedent
without any repercussions for wrongdoing193—an unjust result that
scholars, politicians, and this Comment seek to rectify.194
A. Texas’s Approach: Declaring a Marriage Void Postdeath
In 2007, Texas, a community property state like California,195 adopted
a statute aimed at providing a remedy for family members who discover,
after the death of an incapacitated elder family member, that an
individual manipulated the elder into entering a marriage.196 Texas
found that caretakers were convincing elders, dependent on their care, to
enter into marriages with them in order to inherit from the elder’s
death.197 Prior to this legislation, Texas permitted a marriage to be

189. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
190. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2200–2201, 2210 (West 2004).
191. See supra Part IV.A.
192. McKissock, supra note 21, at 20 (“Without invalidating the marriage, no cause
of action for financial elder abuse exists because a spouse has a right to support, and
proving that he or she has retained property for a ‘wrongful use’ is likely impossible.”
(emphasis omitted)).
193. See id. at 22; Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 300.
194. See infra Parts V.A–B, VI.
195. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (Vernon 2006).
196. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47A (Vernon 2009); TEX. HOUSE RESEARCH
ORG., H.B. 391 BILL ANALYSIS (2007), available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/
PDF/ba80R/HB0391.PDF.
197. TEX. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 196, at 3.
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declared voidable only until the death of one of the spouses,198 like in
California.199 The Texas Legislature recognized a family member’s
difficulty in challenging a marriage before the death of the elder and
therefore expanded the statute to allow for postdeath challenges of a
marriage’s validity.200 The Texas statute allows postdeath challenges
only if the decedent died while married, the marriage commenced less
than three years prior to the decedent’s death, and an interested person201
filed the challenge with the court within one year of the decedent’s
death.202 However, an interested person can continue a suit pending at
the death of one of the spouses even if the marriage occurred more than
three years prior to the decedent’s death.203
In determining the validity of the marriage after the death of one of the
spouses, Texas courts must examine whether the decedent had the
mental capacity to consent to the marriage “on the date the marriage
occurred.”204 The decedent must have understood the nature of the
marriage ceremony.205 A successful challenge eliminates the surviving
spouse status and prevents the surviving party from inheriting the
surviving spouse’s share of the community property upon the decedent’s
death.206 This proposal suffers from a few inadequacies, but perhaps its
greatest flaw is that it allows the state to declare a marriage void after an
elder dies and can no longer testify as to, or be tested for, capacity.207

198. GLENN M. KARISCH, 2007 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE: SUMMARY OF CHANGES AFFECTING
PROBATE, GUARDIANSHIP AND TRUST LAW 16 (2007), http://www.texasprobate.com/07leg/
2007update.pdf.
199. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2211 (West 2004).
200. See KARISCH, supra note 198, at 16.
201. “‘Interested persons’ or ‘persons interested’ means heirs, devisees, spouses, creditors
or any others having a property right in, or claim against, the estate being administered;
and anyone interested in the welfare of an incapacitated person, including a minor.” TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(r) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2009).
202. Id. § 47A (Vernon Supp. 2009).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 294 (noting that the Constitution may not
allow proposals to challenge the validity of marriages postdeath).
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B. An Academic’s Approach: Requiring Testamentary
Capacity for Inheritance Rights
To solve the problem of elders’ marrying despite lacking capacity,
academics and politicians continue to toss out several potential solutions.
Those solutions include the following: first, allowing postdeath challenges
to the validity of the marriage as in Texas;208 second, raising the level of
capacity required to that of testamentary capacity;209 lastly, providing
interested persons with standing to litigate the postdeath property
consequences of an elder’s marriage.210 States may choose not to enforce
either of the first two proposals because both proposals may be
constitutionally impermissible.211 This Comment instead focuses on the
inadequacies of the third academic proposal, articulated by Terry L.
Turnipseed, an assistant professor of law at Syracuse University College
of Law.212 Turnipseed’s proposal limits postdeath challenges involving
one or more parties of questionable capacity to the property
consequences of marriage.213
Turnipseed bases his proposal on the notion that if a person lacks
testamentary capacity, then that person also lacks capacity to devise
property through marriage.214 Under the proposal, if an interested party
can prove the decedent lacked testamentary capacity on the decedent’s
wedding day, then either a prior will of the decedent takes effect—if that
prior will was executed when the testator had testamentary capacity—or
the testator is deemed to have died intestate.215 In either case,
Turnipseed’s proposal treats the decedent as unmarried, preventing the
surviving spouse from inheriting.216 Accordingly, this approach offers a
disincentive for an individual to marry a wealthy, incapacitated elder

208. Knaplund, supra note 22, at 452–53; supra Part V.A.
209. See Posting of Bridget Crawford to Feminist Law Professors Blog,
http://feministlawprofs.law.sc.edu/?p=2353 (Sept. 26, 2007, 08:07 EDT).
210. Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 298–99. Turnipseed’s proposal applies to all
deathbed marriages, not just when an elder marries. Id.
211. Id. at 294. The first proposal does not prohibit marriages but rather
“retroactively revoke[s] the legitimacy of the marriage itself.” Id. The second proposal
limits who can marry by demanding that an elder exhibit a higher level of capacity than
marital capacity. See id.
212. See id. at 275.
213. Id. at 298–99. The academic proposal limits the challenge to the property
consequences of marriage mainly to ensure compliance with the fundamental right to
marry. Id. at 297–99. For a discussion of how the legislation proposed by this Comment
also upholds the fundamental right to marry, see infra Part VI.B.
214. Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 298–99.
215. Id.; see also Frolik & Radford, supra note 94, at 316.
216. Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 298.
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because it prohibits the surviving spouse from inheriting from the
decedent’s estate in the event the court determines that, on the wedding
day, the decedent lacked testamentary capacity.217 Although a novel
idea, this academic proposal, like the Texas statute, does not go far
enough to fix the problem.
C. The Inadequacies of Both Approaches
Although both Texas’s and Turnipseed’s approaches may reduce the
incentive for individuals to marry elderly persons for their money,
neither solution is the most effective approach.218 First, as with will
contests, a postdeath challenge to a marriage raises proof problems
because it occurs when the decedent cannot testify and thus is unable to
provide evidence of capacity.219 Arguably, proof problems are even
more difficult with postdeath marriage challenges because witnesses are
often limited and persons experienced in determining capacity, such as
an estate planning attorney or a physician,220 are generally not present at
marriage ceremonies.221
Secondly, both approaches may induce frivolous litigation by failing
to effectively discourage challenges by greedy or upset family members.222
Surviving family members, especially children of a prior marriage, may
use litigation in an attempt to challenge a decedent spouse’s marital

217. Id. at 298–99.
218. See supra Part V.A–B.
219. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 35, at 205 (noting that regardless of the type of
will contest, challenging either general incapacity or a single insane delusion that led to
the creation of the challenged will, the testator is “by definition dead and unable to
defend himself”); Frolik & Radford, supra note 94, at 309 (“The evidence offered in
[will contests] is by its very nature circumstantial . . . .”); Knaplund, supra note 22, at
452 (recognizing that states may not want to allow challenges to longstanding marriages
after a spouse dies because the decedent cannot “testify, consent, or object to the
proceedings”); Tanibata, supra note 116, at 30–32 (recommending that attorneys document a
testator’s capacity in case litigation arises and the testator is either dead or alive but
incapacitated).
220. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
221. Proof problems can be especially problematic for confidential marriages
because no witnesses are required, limiting the amount of testimony regarding the elder’s
capacity. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., TEX. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., supra note 196, at 6 (documenting
opponent’s argument that House bill 193 would lead to a “flood of litigation”).
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capacity and prevent an innocent surviving spouse from inheriting.223
Thus, the Texas and Turnipseed approaches might have the unintended
effect of inducing postdeath litigation that burdens the court system by
allowing challenges to either perfectly valid marriages or the property
consequences of such marriages.
Moreover, although the postdeath solutions may discourage persons
from marrying an elder or persons near death, neither approach prevents
marriages from occurring in the first place. Under both “solutions,” the
elder remains married, and therefore unprotected, during the elder’s
lifetime. While the elder is still alive, a spouse may deplete the elder’s
assets224 and emotionally abuse or even neglect the elder—much like
Wendi Lewellen did with Ralph Dills225 and Linda Downey did with
Thor Tollefsen.226 Instead, testing an elder’s capacity to marry prior to
marriage, as this Comment suggests, has the benefit of safeguarding
elders from entering into harmful marriages and suffering financially
and emotionally. Thus, rather than judging capacity postdeath, the
elder’s capacity to marry should be judged premarriage.
By potentially allowing frivolous postdeath challenges by greedy
heirs227 and failing to protect the elder during the elder’s lifetime,228 both
Texas’s statute and Turnipseed’s academic proposal seemingly take the
interest of the heirs into consideration above the protection of the elder.
Therefore, despite taking positive strides to discourage individuals from

223. See In re Estate of Gregorson, 116 P. 60, 61–62 (Cal. 1911) (recognizing that
allowing persons to void marriages after the death of one of the spouses can help to
prevent exploitative marriages but, on the other hand, may lead to “many cases in which
a great hardship might be worked on innocent persons if the validity of a marriage which
had been treated by the parties as binding could, after the death of one of them or in a
collateral proceeding, be questioned by a third party asserting that the purported husband
or wife had been of unsound mind at the time of undertaking the marriage”); McMullen,
supra note 35, at 61, 79–82 (noting that family members often come to expect inheritance and
challenge testamentary instruments if the testator disinherits an expecting heir or
beneficiary); Turnipseed, supra note 21, at 299 (noting that protections are needed to
prevent such harassment). Opponents to the Texas legislation suggested that family
members, often children of a prior marriage who disliked the decedent’s new spouse,
may seek to declare even legitimate marriages as invalid. TEX. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG.,
supra note 196, at 6.
224. In re Estate of Williams, No. A092090, 2001 WL 1575522, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 11, 2001) (“[T]hrough various means appellant became the exclusive caregiver for
decedent and controlled access to his person and money at the time the will was executed.
Throughout their relationship, appellant transferred decedent’s money to herself. The
marriage expedited her efforts.” (emphasis added)); see also supra note 24.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 1–11.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 82–83, 170–72.
227. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 224–26.
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marrying people who are near death, both approaches fail to fully protect
elders from unwittingly falling into exploitative marriages.229
VI. ADOPTING A MARITAL CAPACITY TEST TO PREVENT
FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE
Protecting an incapacitated elder from entering into a financially
exploitative marriage is better than first recognizing a marriage only to
determine, after messy postdeath litigation, that the elder lacked
capacity.230 In the case of postdeath litigation for marriages, just as in
challenges involving the validity of testamentary documents, the
decedent is no longer alive to verify either the decedent’s wishes or
capacity.231 Most reputable estate planning attorneys, therefore, try to
ensure that each of their clients meets the required level of testamentary
capacity by observing and questioning each client, as well as possibly
requesting that a client obtain a medical or psychiatric evaluation for
further proof.232 Also, to ensure a testator’s capacity to execute a
testamentary document, an independent certificate of review233 is
required whenever a testator seeks to bequeath property to a nonrelated
caretaker or drafting attorney.234 Unfortunately, no similar procedural
safeguard exists for ensuring one’s capacity to enter into marriage, even
though testamentary documents and marriage both require a minimum
level of capacity and both confer property rights.235
The procedural protection of an independent certificate of review in
the law of trusts and estates can easily be adopted to determine and
document an individual’s marital capacity.236 Such a mandatory marital
capacity test is the best and most effective safeguard for ensuring an
elder meets the required level of marital capacity. In the event of
postdeath challenges to the marriage, the test can serve to prove an

229. See supra notes 218–26 and accompanying text. The Texas statute, in particular,
does not allow postdeath challenges to the marriage based on undue influence. See
McKissock, supra note 21, at 22.
230. See supra Part V.C.
231. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
232. CLARK ET AL., supra note 35, at 207; Tanibata, supra note 116, at 31–32
(advocating additional documentation for clients with questionable capacity).
233. See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 155–62 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part III.
236. See infra Part VI.A.
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elder’s marital capacity and can rebut any presumption of undue
influence over an elder, in the same way that an independent certificate
of review provides clear and convincing evidence of a testator’s
testamentary capacity and freedom from undue influence.237 By
providing clear and convincing evidence of an elder’s marital capacity
and freedom from undue influence, the capacity test should effectively
reduce litigation from third parties who dislike or disapprove of the
marriage.238 The test will also close the loophole to section 21350 of the
California Probate Code because it prevents Tollefsen-Lowney situations
when a person, who is presumptively prohibited from receiving certain
testamentary transfers under section 21350, simply marries the elder to
circumvent the prohibition.239 By testing an elder’s marital capacity
before marriage, the state will protect the elder during the elder’s lifetime
and will better effectuate the elder’s intent regarding the disposition of
property at death.
A. Suggested Marital Capacity Test
The details of the marital capacity test should be developed by a
collaboration of experts, including physicians, estate planning attorneys,
and mental health professionals such as psychiatrists, neuropsychologists,
and clinical psychologists.240 These individuals have experience dealing
with capacity issues and can use their expertise to develop a test that
determines whether an elder maintains the statutorily required mental
functioning to understand the nature and consequences of marriage.241
The test must include several basic elements. First, the marital
capacity test should maintain California’s current definition of “elder”: a
“person residing in [California], 65 years of age or older.”242 Second,
because public policy favors marriage,243 the state must maintain the
237. See Knaplund, supra note 22, at 446–47 (discussing section 21350 and courts’
reluctance to determine that an elder lacks marital capacity); supra text accompanying
notes 163–65.
238. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
240. See Daniel C. Marson et al., Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence in
the Elderly: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 71, 72 (2004)
(explaining the roles of experts in testing testamentary capacity for will contests); Peisah
et al., supra note 21, at 887.
241. See supra note 240.
242. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.27 (West 2001).
243. States and the federal government grant certain legal benefits to married
couples, which include the following: the opportunity to file joint tax returns,
the creation of a confidential relationship between spouses under which spouses do not
have to testify against one another, Social Security, and inheritance rights of the surviving
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level currently required for marital capacity,244 rather than increasing the
required level of capacity to that of testamentary capacity or contractual
capacity.245
Third, the exam must concentrate on whether the individual meets the
necessary capacity to understand marriage and cannot automatically
exclude elders who have a mental health disease.246 A quick,
noninvasive, and affordable test that is commonly used to examine
mental function is the mini mental state examination (MMSE).247 The
MMSE takes less than ten minutes to conduct and involves a series of
questions relating to, among other things, memory, comprehension, and
attention.248 When conducted without any other screening procedures,
the MMSE may prove too brief of a test to provide an accurate
evaluation of capacity.249 Therefore, it is important that qualified persons
administer the test, such as “[h]ealth care professionals with expertise in
the geriatric, psychiatric or neuropsychological field.”250
Additional considerations for the test include asking questions that test
not only for capacity but also for possible undue influence over the
elder,251 administering the test privately with only the elder in the

spouse. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right To Marry,
OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, reprinted in TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL
ISSUES IN HUMAN SEXUALITY 234, 235 (Robert T. Francoeur ed., 3d ed. 1991).
244. Marital capacity currently requires a basic understanding of the nature and
consequences of marriage. Supra notes 102–04.
245. See supra Part III.A. Requiring an elder to satisfy testamentary or contractual
capacity is most likely impermissible under the Constitution because such a requirement
would impose additional burdens on the right to marry by preventing a larger number of
elders from marrying than is necessary to protect them. See supra note 211; infra Part
VI.B.
246. See Marson et al., supra note 240, at 83 (observing that having a mental health
disease such as Alzheimer’s does not automatically mean that the testator lacked
capacity to create a will). For a review of how the law currently accounts for the effects
of mental health diseases on capacity, see supra notes 103–05.
247. 18 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 185 (1992).
248. See id.; see also Lenore Kurlowicz & Meredith Wallace, The Mini Mental
State Examination (MMSE), TRY THIS: BEST PRAC. NURSING CARE TO OLDER ADULTS,
(Hartford Inst. for Geriatric Nursing, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 1999, at 1, available at
http://www.isu.edu/nursing/opd/geriatric/MMSE.pdf. The mini mental examination also
concentrates on reading and writing. Id.
249. Brandriet & Thorn, supra note 15, at 24.
250. Id. (revealing that the MMSE is not a conclusive test, necessitating the use of
neuropsychologists or other trained specialists to test for dementia); Peisah et al., supra
note 21, at 887; infra Part VI.A.1.
251. See infra Part VI.A.2.
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room,252 and administering the test within a reasonable amount of time
before the marriage solemnization.253
1. Who Can Administer the Test?
A qualified mental health professional254 or the elder’s attending
physician should administer the marital capacity test.255 Mental health
professionals routinely deal with capacity issues, and courts rely on their
expert testimony for postdeath determinations of testamentary capacity.256
Elders often visit with the same attending physician on a reoccurring
basis for medical checkups, increasing the likelihood of detecting the
elder’s declining capacity.257
In order to prevent fraudulent capacity tests, the statute should prohibit
certain attending physicians and mental health professionals from
determining an elder’s capacity to marry. The list of individuals
prohibited from taking under a will includes drafters of the document,
relatives and business associates of the drafters, and caretakers.258
Similarly, mental health professionals or attending physicians who are
relatives, friends, or employees of either of the potential spouses should
not perform the capacity test. These individuals may have ulterior
motives that would cause them to falsely declare that the elder either
lacks or possesses marital capacity. For example, an administrator who
is also a relative of the elder’s potential spouse may keep that individual’s
financial interests primarily in mind and incorrectly claim the elder
possesses marital capacity. Alternatively, an administrator who is
related to the elder may falsely claim the elder lacks capacity because
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See Brandriet & Thorn, supra note 15, at 23–24; infra Part VI.A.2.
See infra Part VI.A.3.
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
Marson et al., supra note 240, at 72. The author wrote:
Legal cases involving issues of TC [testamentary capacity] and undue influence
very frequently involve mental health professionals (MHPs) . . . . The roles of
these MHPs can vary widely, from consulting with attorneys about clients with
questionable capacity, to clinically evaluating testators for TC prior to will
execution, to conducting post-mortem retrospective evaluations of TC and the
validity of a previously executed will . . . .

Id.
257. In the law of trusts and estates, an attending physician’s testimony that
the testator had testamentary capacity upon signing the instrument constitutes persuasive
evidence for the proponent of the will. CLARK ET AL., supra note 35, at 207. “A doctor
has the best opportunity to observe the testator’s ‘organic condition’ and to speak with
experience and authority about the testator’s capabilities.” Id.
258. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (West Supp. 2009). Section 21351 contains some
statutory exceptions; for a list of exceptions, see supra note 158.
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the administrator does not like the potential spouse or is skeptical of the
potential spouse’s motive to marry the elder. Due to the potential for
abuse, the statute should prohibit mental health professionals or
attending physicians who are related to either of the marital parties from
determining the elder’s capacity.
2. Testing for Undue Influence
The statute should also require that only the elder and the
administrator are present in the room during the marital capacity test.
By performing the test outside the presence of the potential spouse, as
well as family and friends of either party, the administrator can minimize
outside influence on the elder.259 When no one else is present during the
test, the elder may provide more forthright answers to questions
regarding whether the potential spouse is exerting undue influence over
the elder.260 To determine whether undue influence is present, the
administrator should ask questions that reveal whether the elder has a
general loss of independent thought or a forced dependency on the
potential spouse.261 In addition to asking questions that assess “the
[elder]’s understanding of the proposed marriage to the proposed spouse,
and the responsibilities and duties of marriage to that person,”262 some
259. See, e.g., Julia L. Birkel et al., Litigating Financial Elder Abuse Claims, L.A.
LAW., Oct. 2007, at 19, 20 (“[T]o properly investigate a financial elder abuse claim, it is
important to meet the elder separately from other family members to ascertain whether
the elder truly consents to the intervivos transfer, modifications to testamentary documents, or
other affairs affecting the estate.”); Brandriet & Thorn, supra note 15, at 23.
260. See Brandriet & Thorn, supra note 15, at 23–24.
261. See Trent J. Thornley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the
Foundation of Undue Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 518 (1995). Under the law of trusts
and estates, a challenger to a will must show undue influence by proving some of the
following factors: (1) the suspected influencer had opportunity to influence the testator,
which is proven by factors such as dependency of and access to the testator, for example,
living with the testator; (2) the suspected influencer had motive to influence, which is
proven by providing evidence that the suspected influencer had something to gain by the
undue influence; and (3) the testator was susceptible to influence, which requires examining
whether or not the testator had a weak mind. Id. at 517–19. The administrator of the
proposed marital capacity test can ask the elder questions that may reveal opportunity,
motive, or susceptibility. See id. at 518.
262. Peisah et al., supra note 21, at 887. Sample questions for an assessor to ask
relating to the elder’s understanding of marital relationships include the following:
“‘What is your understanding of what marriage is?’”; “‘Why are you marrying X?’”; and
“‘What is your understanding of your responsibilities to your spouse and what are your
spouse’s responsibilities to you when you get married?’” Id.
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sample questions to check for undue influence include asking whether
the potential spouse secludes the elder from family and friends, whether
the elder feels dependent upon the potential spouse, and about the nature
of the couple’s relationship.
3. Timeframe for Administering the Test
To ensure accurate results, the marital capacity test should be
administered reasonably close in time to the solemnization. In the law of
trusts and estates, a court generally gives an assessment of testamentary
capacity more weight the closer in time the assessment occurs before or
after the execution of an estate planning document.263 But under current
law, a couple has ninety days from the date they obtain a marriage
license before the couple must solemnize the marriage and return the
marital certificate to the county clerk.264 To account for the fact that
capacity assessments conducted closer in time to solemnization better
account for capacity, the county clerk should not transfer the marriage
license into a marriage certificate under this proposal until receiving
both the marriage license, signed and filled out by the parties, and a
signed certificate from a mental health professional or attending physician
confirming that the elder spouse has capacity to marry.
Critics of this Comment’s proposal may argue that requiring a test,
which is an additional step to marriage, imposes a virtual waiting period
for an elder to marry. However, other states already impose mandatory
waiting requirements between applying for and obtaining a marriage
license.265 Under those statutes, a competent elder can theoretically obtain a
marriage license and die prior to obtaining a certificate of marital
capacity, thus failing to meet the statutory requirements. Although
unfortunate, it is possible that an elder may die prior to obtaining a
capacity test, just as it is possible that an elder may die prior to the legal
completion of a marriage in states that currently impose mandatory
waiting periods.
States with mandatory waiting periods allow for a waiver of the
waiting period in emergencies.266 Likewise, the California Legislature

263. See Marson et al., supra note 240, at 84.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54.
265. Wisconsin mandates a five-day waiting period. WIS. STAT. § 765.08 (2009).
Minnesota also requires five days between application and license. MINN. STAT. § 517.08,
subdiv. 1b(a) (2006). Texas requires three days between the issuance of the marriage license
and the marriage ceremony. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.204 (Vernon 2006).
266. Minnesota waives the waiting period when extraordinary circumstances exist.
§ 517.08, subdiv. 1b(a). Wisconsin allows the county clerk to exercise discretion in waiving
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might consider allowing probate judges, who often review elder law
issues,267 to waive the proposed requirement of a marital capacity test.
Probate judges routinely determine testamentary capacity in postdeath
litigation of testamentary documents268 or in judicial review of a
conservatee’s capacity to marry.269 Judicial review by probate judges
could easily be extended—beyond checking for marital capacity of
conserved elders—to determine marital capacity for any elder who
intends to marry. The judge should review the elder’s mental functioning
and also review the facts leading to the marriage to ensure the marriage
is not procured by undue influence.270 This exemption affords more
freedom to couples seeking legitimate marriages but still ensures that the
elder possesses the capacity necessary to enter into a marital contract.
4. Potential Costs of a Marital Capacity Test
Requiring an elder to obtain a certificate of review of marital capacity
will cost money, mainly the cost of visiting the mental health professional
or assisting physician.271 If a person is unable to afford the services of
the five-day waiting period provided that the applicant pays an additional amount of
money up to $10. § 765.08. Texas excuses members of the military and waives the waiting
period upon judicial approval by the family law court. § 2.204.
267. See Birkel et al., supra note 259, at 19 (noting that claims brought under CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 15610.30 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009) “do not necessarily get tried
in Probate Court, where judges are more familiar with elder law”).
268. In the case of reviewing testamentary capacity, the individual is deceased and
the judge must rely on factual evidence of the testator’s behavior and the potential influence
of persons or factors, as well as testimony presented by attending physicians, attorneys,
friends, neighbors, business associates, attesting witnesses, and perhaps even psychiatrist
experts. See CLARK ET AL., supra note 35, at 206–08.
269. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sawyer, No. A104303, 2004 WL 1834670, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2004). After physicians determined Charles Sawyer lacked the
mental functioning to resist fraud and undue influence or to carry out some day-to-day
tasks, he was appointed a general conservator. Id. The conservator tried to stop Sawyer
from marrying his long-term-friend-turned-paid-caretaker by seeking a judicial proceeding to
determine if Sawyer maintained the capacity to enter into the marriage. Id. at *3. The
couple married before the judicial determination occurred. See id. The new spouse tried
to prohibit the conservator from seeing Sawyer and even filed a petition to remove the
conservator. Id. at *3–4. The conservator filed for an annulment proceeding, and the
court determined Sawyer did in fact lack capacity to marry. Id. at *8.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 103–05; supra Part VI.A.2.
271. Compare Robert D. Goodman, In Sickness or in Health: The Right To Marry
and the Case of HIV Antibody Testing, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 87, 106 (1988) (reasoning that
if premarital HIV testing were imposed, some couples would decide not to
marry because the roughly $200 to $300 cost would be prohibitive), with J.D.
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the administrator, then the legislature may consider providing a certified
mental health professional to perform the test at no charge to the
indigent individual.272 Providing services to those who cannot afford
them will impose costs on the state.273 However, the potential costs
imposed, either on elders themselves or the state, are justified from a
public policy perspective because examining elders will reduce the
incidence of financial elder abuse without infringing the right to
marry.274
Alternatively, the California Legislature can choose to completely
exempt individuals who suffer undue hardship from having to pay for an
examination. When the California Legislature imposed statutory
prohibitions regarding to whom a testator could transfer property, it
maintained an exemption for transfers of $3000 or less.275 The California
Legislature could provide a similar exemption to those who it deems
cannot pay for a capacity examination. Presumably, if an elder cannot
financially afford the test, it is unlikely that an individual is taking
advantage of the elder’s weakened capacity for financial gain. If the
state provides alternatives for those who cannot afford the exam, then all
elderly individuals, who have a minimum level of capacity, will have
equal access to marriage.
5. Widespread Adoption of the Marital Capacity Test
Opponents might argue that until other states adopt the suggested
marital capacity test, individuals will simply marry elders in another
state, thus undermining the California Legislature’s efforts. However,
California serves as a legal trendsetter.276 If California creates and
Lounsbery, Athletic Commission, CAL. REG. L. REP., Spring/Summer 1994, at 38, 38
(projecting a reduction in the cost of the “Mini-Mental Status Exam” because of
additional trained administers of the exam).
272. See, e.g., Legislation & Regulations, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 373, 373 (describing how, in cases of involuntarily committed persons with mental
illnesses who are deemed dangerous, the Department of Mental Health must pay for the
mental health exam of any indigents who request one).
273. See, e.g., Monica Land, State Officials Question Mandatory STD Testing,
MISS. LINK, June 19, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 13651108 (discussing that the
requirement for couples to obtain a premarital syphilis screening has cost the State of
Mississippi nearly three million dollars over the past ten years).
274. See infra Part VI.B; see, e.g., Goodman, supra note 271, at 107 (“[In the case
of premarital HIV testing, [i]t appears unlikely that the imposition of a $200 or $300 cost
would in and of itself constitute substantial interference with a non-indigent’s right to
marry.”).
275. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21351(h) (West Supp. 2009).
276. E.g., Kathryn E. Litchman, Mentorship Article, Punishing the Protectors: The
Illinois Domestic Violence Act Remedy for Victims of Domestic Violence Against Police
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adopts the proposed marital capacity test, then other states might also
choose to adopt it because the benefits of the test warrant its adoption on
a nationwide scale. Even if other states do not create legislation that
requires some sort of marital capacity test, the benefits of the test, and
society’s view of marriage, necessitate its implementation in California.
B. Protecting Versus Restricting Marriage
The proposed statute may raise questions regarding its effect on an
elder’s ability to enter into marriage, but the capacity test is not intended
to discourage individuals from entering into marriage or to prohibit the
state’s formal recognition of a couple’s love.277 The proposed marital
capacity test aims only to prohibit elders from marrying when they lack
marital capacity, and the test can achieve that goal by enforcing the
current statutory prerequisite to marriage—that each spouse enters into
marriage with sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and
duties of the marital contract.278 Although the marital capacity test may
deter marriages involving elders who actually have marital capacity,279
the benefits of protecting elders who lack marital capacity far outweigh
the potential that some elders may choose not to marry due to the
additional requirement of obtaining a certificate of marital capacity.
The constitutionality of the marital capacity test must be examined
because of the potential deterring effects on marriage. After all, states
favor marriages, legally recognizing marriages “regardless of whether
the spouses love, respect, or even see each other on a regular basis.”280
Misconduct, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 765, 801 (2007) (noting that California has a reputation
as a legal trendsetter and that California jurisprudence is often later followed by other
jurisdictions).
277. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 427 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he right to marry
does obligate the state to take affirmative action to grant official, public recognition to
the couple’s relationship as a family, as well as to protect the core elements of the family
relationship from at least some types of improper interference by others.” (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted)).
278. See Dunphy v. Dunphy, 119 P. 512, 513 (Cal. 1911); supra Part III.A.
279. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 271, at 106–07 (explaining the deterring
effects on marriage of mandatory HIV testing).
280. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK,
Fall 1989, reprinted in TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN
HUMAN SEXUALITY, supra note 243, at 239, 242. “Sham marriages,” in which people
engage to ensure legal immigration status, are one example of a type of marriage into
which couples enter for a benefit other than love. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1062
(9th ed. 2009) (“[A sham marriage is a] purported marriage in which all the formal
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The government’s support of marriage is legally required because, in
1967, the United States Supreme Court described marriage as a
“fundamental right,” meaning that marriage is a basic human right that
requires judicial protection.281 California, therefore, upholds the fundamental
right to marry and is actually even more protective of the right than the
federal government.282
Regardless of the fundamental right to marry, each state may impose
prerequisites to marriage,283 such as age requirements284 and licensing
requirements.285 States may even prohibit marriages.286 If the legislature
requirements are met or seemingly met, but in which the parties go through the ceremony
with no intent of living together as husband and wife.”). In addition to marriages for
immigration status, loveless marriages may also occur for political advantage, financial
benefits, shielding homosexuality—a so-called lavender marriage—and other reasons
that do not pertain to love, such as marrying for the sake of children. See, e.g., John L.
McCormack, Title to Property, Title to Marriage: The Social Foundation of Adverse
Possession and Common Law Marriage, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 461, 490 n.140 (2008)
(citing EDWARD B. TYLOR, ANTHROPOLOGY 247 (Leslie A. White ed., Univ. Mich. Press
1960) (1881)) (noting that prior to the modern nation states, and to some extent today,
marriage served to transfer property rights and played an important role in solidifying
alliances between families, tribes, and clans).
281. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding Virginia’s antimiscegenation
statute unconstitutional based on racial discrimination and because “[t]he freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men”); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 378, 388
(1978) (holding a Wisconsin statute unconstitutional because it indefinitely prohibited
some individuals from marrying even though the individuals had the legal capacity to
marry).
282. Compare In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 419 (conveying the fundamental
right to marriage even though the California Constitution “does not contain any explicit
reference” to such a right), with Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due
Process Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2806–07 (2005) (noting
that in Zablocki, the United States Supreme Court deviated from strict scrutiny and
instead “used language that implied an intermediate level of review” (citing Zablocki,
434 U.S. at 388)).
283. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 (“[R]easonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed.”). The Court distinguished Zablocki from Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977), a case it had decided a year earlier, which upheld a provision of the Federal
Social Security Act that effectively cut off benefits to disabled individuals who chose to
remarry. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386–87.
284. See supra Part III.A.
285. California requires both marriage licenses and certificates in order for a valid
marriage to exist. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 500.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). The
marriage license serves as an indicator that “[no] impediments to [the] marriage exist”
and that the couple has met the required level of capacity. LIND, supra note 58, at 187.
286. See e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 407–08, 434 n.52; id. 463–64
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting); In re Estate of Gregorson, 116 P. 60, 61 (Cal.
1911) (“[T]he legislature has full control of the subject of marriage, and may fix the
conditions under which the marital status may be created or ended, as well as the effect
of an attempted creation of that status . . . .”). Likewise, the United States Supreme
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imposes a prerequisite to marriage that “significantly interfere[s] with
decisions to enter into the marital relationship,”287 then under California
law the proposed prerequisite must pass strict scrutiny.288 A restriction
on marriage passes strict scrutiny if the state can show “a compelling
state interest . . . [that] is necessary to serve that compelling state
interest.”289
Protecting elders and society from the repercussions of elder abuse
and protecting the sanctity of marriage are compelling state interests that
justify requiring that elders pass a marital capacity test prior to marrying.290
First, the California Legislature already recognizes a state interest in
protecting its elders,291 who make up “a disadvantaged class requiring

Court explicitly explained that states can prohibit marriages if there is incest, bigamy, an
underage spouse, or inability to pass a venereal disease exam. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392
(Stewart, J., concurring). Scholars find inherent contradictions in calling marriage a
fundamental right but then allowing the state to deny some marriages. See, e.g., Pull,
supra note 51, at 22; Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081,
2081 (2005). If an unlimited right existed, a person could marry someone of the same
sex, a relative, or even “their dog, their aunt, June 29, a rose petal, or a sunny day.” Id.
287. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added).
288. Strict scrutiny applies when a law prohibits or interferes with a fundamental
right—right to marriage, privacy, interstate travel, et cetera—or discriminates against a
minority group—“gender, race, and religion—a constitutionally suspect basis upon
which to impose differential treatment.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401; ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 793–94 (3d. ed. 2006).
289. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401; see also People v. Sweeney, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 557, 563 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting People v. Goslar, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 562
(Ct. App. 1999)). Some cases state the second part of the strict scrutiny test as whether
the ordinance or statute is “narrowly tailored to promote [the] compelling governmental
interest.” Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997). Either the
Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clauses can form the basis for the strict
scrutiny test; in this instance, the validity of a marital capacity test can be challenged
under either clause because the test “denies a right to some, while allowing it to others.”
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 288, at 793–94. Arguably, this Comment’s proposal does not
need to address strict scrutiny but rather the lower rational basis scrutiny because
mandating a marital capacity test “‘does not make marriage practically impossible for a
particular class of persons’”; instead, it upholds the marital capacity prerequisite to
marriage. Oritz v. L.A. Police Relief Ass’n, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 684 (Ct. App.
2002) (quoting Parks v. City of Warner Robins, Ga., 43 F.3d 609, 614–15 (11th Cir.
1995)); see also supra note 287.
290. See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 946 (“The City has a compelling interest in protecting
the entire community from crime.”); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401–02 (reviewing
whether it is necessary to retain the traditional definition of marriage to uphold the
sanctity of marriage).
291. See supra notes 46, 119, 133 and accompanying text.
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special protection.”292 Second, the state legislature also recognizes the
need to protect family members—not wrongdoers—from disinheritance.293
Lastly, the state appoints conservators to protect elders when they can no
longer care for themselves, thus further evincing the government’s
interest in protecting its elderly citizens.294
These protective measures have been imposed to safeguard the
compelling state interest of protecting elders from abuse and to protect
society from the repercussions of such abuse. An elder who marries
without capacity may affect the elder’s life, the lives of the elder’s
family members, and society as a whole; the elder may face financial
abuse, the family may lose inheritance, and society may have to account
for the impoverishment or dependency of either the elder or a member of
the elder’s family as a result of the loss of the elder’s financial
resources.295 By testing an individual for marital capacity, the
mental health professional or attending physician may discover that the
elder lacks more than marital capacity but actually requires the
appointment of a conservator. Thus, an elder is further protected from
abuse by others because if the elder is truly incompetent, the elder may
receive a court-appointed conservator to manage the elder’s affairs.296
Also, society suffers from a social perspective when the state allows
marriages that result from undue influence or a lack of capacity; the
significance of marriage is devalued when an elder enters into marriage
while lacking the capacity to properly consent to it.297 States already
restrict marriage by imposing capacity requirements in order to ensure
that only those individuals capable of consenting actually marry.298 For
example, the United States Supreme Court held that minors lack the

292. Respondents’ Brief at 35, Lowney v. Bergsaker, 2009 WL 3470401 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 28, 2009) (No. A123071); see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
293. See supra Part IV.A.
294. See supra notes 12, 269.
295. For example, a lonely elderly gentleman lost his house and life savings after
giving several loans to a much younger female neighbor. See Charles Duhigg, When
Shielding Money Clashes with Elders’ Free Will, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2007, at A1.
This story highlights how easily an individual can con a lonely or incapacitated elder into
giving gifts to the elder’s detriment. Id. This particular elder lost almost all of his assets,
which at one time included his house worth $650,000 and bank accounts worth $500,000. Id.
He was left with less than $6000 and as of 2007 lived in a tiny spare bedroom off his
step-daughter’s house. Id.
296. See Ross, supra note 12, at 759. A relative of the proposed conservatee or
“‘interested’ state or local entities” may file a petition for appointment of a conservator
out of concern for the elder. See id. (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 1820(a) (West 2002)).
297. See supra Part III.B.
298. See supra Part III.A.
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capacity necessary to enter into some contracts and to marry.299 A
compelling state interest exists to protect minors.300 The goal of the
minimum age requirement for capacity reflects similar goals to the
marital capacity test proposed in this Comment: protecting elders and
ensuring that individuals are capable of consenting to marriage.301
The marital capacity test is narrowly tailored and necessary to meet
the state’s compelling interests of protecting elders from financial abuse
and ensuring marital capacity. First, allowing an elder to marry without
capacity will “alter the legal framework of the institution of marriage”
because allowing an incapacitated elder to marry means that the elder
does not meet the statutory prerequisites of marriage.302 Second, the
solutions offered by the Texas statute and Turnipseed’s proposal do not
solve the problem; both suggestions only apply after the elder has
already died and, therefore, cannot remedy any financial abuse or other
elder abuse that occurs during the marriage.303 The proposed marital
capacity test, however, protects an elder during the elder’s lifetime and
protects the elder’s intent in regard to property distribution upon the

299. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 392 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[A]
State may legitimately say that no one can marry . . . who is not at least 14 years
old . . . .”); Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 714 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“The State’s important interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a
number of protective measures . . . premised on the fact that young persons frequently make
unwise choices with harmful consequences . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Moe v.
Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982) (“In light of New York’s important interest in
promoting the welfare of children by preventing unstable marriages among those lacking
the capacity to act in their own best interests we agree . . . that the New York statutory
scheme passes constitutional muster.” (citation omitted)).
300. See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997)
(applying strict scrutiny in determining whether an ordinance infringed on minors’
fundamental rights of free movement and travel). In Nunez, the Ninth Circuit examined
how minors differ from adults but determined that “[a]lthough the state may have a
compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that
[a] lesser degree of scrutiny [than the strict scrutiny applied in reviewing infringements
for adults’ fundamental rights] is appropriate to review burdens on minors’ fundamental
rights.” Id.
301. See id.
302. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008) (finding the opposite
result for same-sex marriages “because same-sex couples who choose to marry will be
subject to the same obligations and duties that currently are imposed on married opposite-sex
couples”).
303. See supra Part V. Unfortunately, however, none of the proposals can prevent a
person from abusing or taking advantage of an elder notwithstanding marriage. See, e.g.,
supra note 295.
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elder’s death. Lastly, the proposal provides exceptions so as only to
restrict the fundamental right to marry as is necessary.304
VII. CONCLUSION
As the elderly population increases, it is likely that financial elder
abuse will continue to grow.305 California provides some layers of
protection but currently does not sufficiently protect elders.306 These
laws do little to prevent individuals from trapping elders in marriages for
their financial assets.307 California must focus on preventing its elderly
population from entering into financially exploitative marriages. The
best remedy to thwarting individuals from taking advantage of elders is
to ensure each elder has the requisite marital capacity before an elder can
marry.
The California Legislature should require a marital capacity test for
elders entering into marriage. Confidential marriages allow an individual to
hide a financially exploitative marriage from the elder’s family more
easily than a public marriage.308 The legislature must, at a very minimum,
adopt the proposal for confidential marriages. However, if the legislature
chooses to apply this Comment’s proposal only to confidential marriages,
then it will merely put a dent in the problem of financially exploitative
marriages to elders. The same potential for elder abuse occurs for elders
who enter into confidential marriages as those who enter into public
marriages.309 Therefore, adopting the marital capacity test for all types
of California marriage is the optimal solution.
A marital capacity test is constitutionally permissive and is the best
solution for preventing elder abuse resulting from financially exploitative
marriages. 310 The proposed test is simple, easily enforceable, and
effective. The benefits of the test—ensuring that elders have the
capacity to consent to marriage—outweigh any minimal drawbacks. It
304. See supra Part VI.A.3–4; see, e.g., Nunez, 114 F.3d at 949 (citing Waters v.
Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (D.D.C. 1989)) (concluding that a juvenile curfew ordinance
was not constitutional because the ordinance lacked exceptions).
305. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part IV.
307. See supra Part IV.
308. See supra Part II.B.1.
309. A family member, whether out of curiosity or suspecting wrongdoing, can
contact the court to find out whether an elder has entered into a marriage—so even if a
family member could not get the exact date of a confidential marriage, the family member
could still challenge the marriage and have the court order the record of marriage unsealed.
Therefore, confidential marriages are not so much more dangerous than public marriages.
See supra Part II.B.1.
310. See supra Part VI.B.
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may be impossible to prevent all of the Senator Dills-type situations of
gross elder abuse, but preventing the exploitation of elders who lack
capacity is a step in the right direction.
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